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I. Introduction
Trade laws on both ends of a U.S.-Latin American business ar-
rangement can be vital to its success. Trade laws govern customs duty
levels, cross-border investment restrictions, anti-bribery rules, export li-
censing, import licensing, subsidy disciplines and many other prac-
tices. They can be used to help open or to close markets. The rules
apply on multilateral, regional and national bases, sometimes creating
a patchwork of conditions applying to the same goods and services.
This article surveys the major U.S.-Latin American trading rules
from the United States viewpoint. These are the multilateral disci-
plines and remedies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO); regional and
subregional agreements, primarily the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), MERCOSUR, and the Andean Pact; and United
States laws affecting imports and exports, principally the antidumping
and countervailing duty statutes, Section 301, export control laws and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
International businesses should view these various legal regimes as
important elements of their planning and operations, especially now.
All of these rules are undergoing major changes, due primarily to im-
plementation of the results of Uruguay Round multilateral trade nego-
tiations, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and other Latin American trading
arrangements. These many changes create both uncertainty and new
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opportunities in U.S.-Latin American trade for virtually all goods and
services providers.
II. The GATT/WTO Multilateral Trading Rules
For over forty years the most important source of worldwide trad-
ing rules has been the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GAIT 1947).' As the largest multilateral trade agreement in terms of
scope and signatory countries, the GATT has provided the legal foun-
dation for international trade and trading rules since 1947.2 As ofJan-
uary 1, 1995, however, the GATT (in its updated GATT 1994 version)
has been just one piece-albeit the cornerstone-of an integrated set
of multilateral trade agreements that resulted from the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations.3 This article will refer to these instru-
ments and documents collectively as the GATT/WTO 1994 rules or
agreements. A brief historical review will bring us to the terms of the
new agreements, including GATT 1994.
A. From the GATT to the WTO
The GATT 1947 was a multilateral agreement establishing rules
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. (5), (6), 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATr 1947].
2 For basic reference works on the GATT, seeJOHN H.JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLT
TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989) [hereinaf-
ter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
3 The final texts of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, including the Agreement
Establishing the the World Trade Orgainization as signed on April 15, 1994, are available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, GATT File. Selected portions of the Final Act are published at Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and .Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Final Act]. When this article was prepared, the com-
plete set of agreements had not yet been published in International Legal Materials or Trea-
ties in Force. They are available, though, from the GATT Secretariat in GATT SECRETARIAT,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE LEGAL
TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL TEXTS]. They are also reprinted in Uruguay Round
Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative
Action, and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). For the sake of convenience, the Uruguay Round trade agreements will be referred
to in this article by the following abbreviations: Agreement on Agriculture (Agriculture
Agreement); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement); Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (Textiles Agreement); Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement); Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement); Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Valuation Agreement);
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI Agreement); Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures (Import Licensing Agreement); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (Subsidies Agreement); Agreement on Safeguards (Safeguards Agreement); Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS Agreement); Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement); and Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). See infra notes 18-28 and accompa-
nying text for a further explanation of the items included in the Final Act.
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and disciplines affecting trade, and a forum for its member trading
partners to discuss and resolve trading issues.4 As an agreement, it es-
tablished two central obligations: to limit the level of tariffs and to
provide "most-favored nation" or MFN treatment on imported goods
from other GATT members.5 It also provided a "Code of Conduct" for
government behavior in regulating international trade in goods, by es-
tablishing disciplines on assessment of antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, customs valuation of goods, marks of origin and other
areas.6 In addition, GATT evolved into an institution, although
plagued by uncertainties related to its lack of a clear legal charter.7
From 1947 to 1979, seven "rounds" of multilateral negotiations
were held under GATT auspices, reducing worldwide levels of duties
on imports and clarifying and expanding GATT obligations as to the
trade of goods.8 In 1986, the eighth and most ambitious round of ne-
gotiations was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay (Uruguay
Round) .9 In addition to further tariff concessions, the Uruguay Round
aimed to reduce the non-tariff barriers to trade in goods that had pro-
liferated as tariff barriers had declined.' 0 It also aimed to bring serv-
ices and intellectual property into the GATT framework, and to
reinforce multilateral trade provisions in agriculture and other sensi-
tive sectors."
The negotiations culminated with approval of the Uruguay Round
Final Act (Final Act) on December 15, 1993.12 It was signed by 124
governments and the European Communities on April 15, 1994 in
Marrakesh, Morocco,' 3 and it entered into force on January 1, 1995.14
4 See, e.g., JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 39-52; JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE, supra note 2, at 9-12, 29-32, 119-22.
5 GATT 1947, supra note 1, arts. I, II;JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, at 40-41;see
infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text discussing MFN.
6 GAT 1947, supra note 1, art. II; seeJACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note
2, at 40-41.
7 See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 2, at 119-143.
8 SeeJACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 117; PHILLIP EVANS &JAMES
WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GATT 10 (1994). According to a GATT authority, these
seven rounds reduced tariffs on "nonprimary" products of industrial countries to an average
of 4.7%. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 53. "Nonprimary" in GATT
terms generally means processed products. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XVI, § B, 2.
Another authority states that pre-Uruguay Round tariffs of developed countries on industrial
products were an average of 6.4%. EVANS & WALSH, supra, at 73. Although it is difficult to
pin down precise numbers, there is general agreement that tariff barriers on industrial prod-
ucts in developed countries were already low before the Uruguay Round. See id.; JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 53.
9 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 10, 14.
10 See id., supra note 8, at 10;JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 130.
Non-tariff barriers can include quotas, rules of origin, import licensing procedures, an-
tidumping duties, and any other type of government measure designed to restrict the
amount of imports. EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 10; JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYS-
TEM, supra note 2, at 130.
11 See Final Act, supra note 3, at 5 (introductory note).
12 Id. at 1.
13 See THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at iii (Marrakesh Declaration of April 15, 1994).
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As of July 1, 1995, one hundred countries had ratified the Final Act
and become WTO members, 28 GATT members were not yet WTO
members, and 28 other countries had made GATT-WTO accession re-
quests. 15 The United States and Mexico are signatories, as are Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and all other Central and
South American countries except Ecuador and Panama.1 6 These lat-
ter two have made accession requests.1 7
B. The Uruguay Round Final Act
The Final Act actually consists of a series of documents. These are
the Final Act itself; the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO Agreement) and agreements annexed to it; various
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions; an Understanding on Commit-
ments in Financial Services; and each of the contracting parties' indi-
vidual schedules of concessions.1 8
The WTO Agreement is central. It establishes the WTO as the
international organization principally responsible for global trade reg-
ulation, replacing and strengthening the role of the GATT as an insti-
tution.1 9 Further, its annexes contain the four major multilateral
agreements that reflect the main results of the Uruguay Round. These
are: (1) The Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, which are
thirteen substantive agreements on trade in goods, including the
GATT 1994 (which explicitly incorporates the whole of GATT 1947)
(Annex IA); (2) the new General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) (Annex 1B); (3) the new Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) (Annex IC); and
(4) the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU) (Annex 2)20
14 See GATI NEWSLETER (GATT), No. 113, Dec. 1994, at 1.
15 See WTO NEWSLETTER (WTO), No. 3, May/June 1995, at 5. Before they may become
WTO members, participants must be contracting parties to the GATT. Final Act, supra note
3, 5, at 12.
16 See WTO NEWSLETTER (WTO), No. 3, May/June 1995, at 5.
17 Id.
18 Final Act, supra note 3, 1, at 11-12. The country schedules are incorporated into
GATT 1994 by language in Article II and by the Protocol, which expressly calls for their
annexation to GATT 1994. See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATT 1994, art. 11(7); Final
Act, supra note 3, at 39 (Uruguay Round Protocol to the GATT 1994, 1). This article's
reference to GATr/WTO 1994 rules or agreements encompasses all of these items included
in the Uruguay Round Final Act.
19 Final Act, supra note 3, at 15. At a late date, the negotiators changed the name of the
new organization from the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) to the World Trade Or-
ganization. See Final Act, supra note 3, at 2 (Corrigendum to Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993). Thus,
references to the MTO in earlier versions of the Final Act have been corrected in later ver-
sions to WTO.
20 Final Act, supra note 3, annexes 1-2, at 10 (listing contents of annexes only; selective
agreements reproduced); THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 20-433. Annexes 3 and 4 consist
of a Trade Policy Review mechanism and several plurilateral trade agreements, not discussed
further in this article. See THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 434-38.
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These various multilateral agreements are a package deal; WTO
signatories must accept and be bound by all of them.2 1 As stated in the
WTO Agreement, the multilateral agreements in the annexes "are inte-
gral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members." 22 Conse-
quently, WTO members will not be able to pick and choose the
portions of the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements to which they will ad-
here-a significant change from practice under the GATT 1947.23
Collectively, the GATT/WTO 1994 multilateral agreements establish
core principles and procedures common to the various substantive dis-
ciplines. 24 With special flexibility for Latin American and other devel-
oping economies,2 5 they make significant progress in establishing
uniform rules for trade in goods,2 6 services 27 and intellectual property
rights. 28 The rest of this section will review the features that make
these advances.
C. Common Principles
Much of each GATT/WTO 1994 agreement is unique to the sub-
stantive area covered. There are, though, some basic principles and
procedures, which in combination establish basic conditions of fair-
ness and certainty in international trade.
1. Non-Discrimination
Perhaps the most important of these principles is non-discrimina-
tion. Non-discrimination means that signatories may not apply meas-
ures that disadvantage imports relative either to each other or to
national products. The mechanisms for achieving non-discrimination
are requirements of most-favored nation (MFN) and national
treatment. 29
The basic MFN obligation is central to the GATI' and stems from
GATT 1994 Article I. It requires each country to give all trading part-
ners the same advantages as its "most favored" one, even if the treat-
ment is more favorable than the country gives its own nationals. 30
21 See Final Act, supra note 3, 1 4, at 12.
22 Final Act, supra note 3, at 15 (WTO Agreement, art. II, 1 2).
23 The Tokyo Round of negotiations under the GATT (1973-1979) resulted in a series
of separate treaties, called "Codes," that supplemented the basic GATT rules on trade in
goods. SeeJACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 39. The Codes were volun-
tary, though, and not all GATT contracting parties acceded to them. See, e.g.,Judith H. Bello
& Mary E. Footer, Preface to Symposium, Uruguay Round-GATT/WFO, 29 INT'L LAw. 335, 336
(Summer 1995); 1992 GATT AcTIVITIES, annex IV (1993), annex IV (listing GATT signatories
that accepted each code as of December 31, 1992).
24 See infra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 75-216 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 216-48 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 249-69 and accompanying text.
29 SeeJACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 133.
30 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATT 1994, art. I.
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Through MFN, all imports are put on the same footing. For example,
a reduction in customs import duties that is given to one trading part-
ner must be accorded to all who are entitled to MFN treatment.
In the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements, MFN is made an explicit
obligation of many agreements. The agreements on sanitary and
phytosanitary standards,3 1 technical barriers to trade,3 2 rules of ori-
gin 33 and safeguards, 34 for example, expressly call for non-discrimina-
tory treatment among WTO member imports. The agreements on
services and intellectual property extend this important GAT[ princi-
ple into those areas of trade.3 5
National treatment also stems from the GATT 1947, now GATT
1994. Article III sets forth the basic principle, which is that govern-
ments may treat imports no less favorably than products of national
origin.36 For example, the United States was found to have violated
national treatment with Section 337, a United States law for enforcing
claims that imported goods infringe United States patents. 3 7 Section
337 offended national treatment principles because it gave complain-
ants a choice of forum in which to challenge imported but not domes-
tic products, among other inequities.3 8
Many of the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements reinforce the basic na-
tional treatment obligation with explicit or more detailed require-
ments. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs Agreement), for example, bars investment measures that of-
fend national treatment, such as conditioning foreign investment on
the purchase or use of domestic origin products.3 9 The agreements on
technical barriers to trade,40 preshipment inspection 41 and rules of or-
igin 42 also embody non-discrimination obligations.
2. Transparency
Transparency is a second key GATT/WTO 1994 principle. Trans-
parency means that measures affecting trade must be known to those
Sd., SPS Agreement, art. 2(3) (with the qualification of"arbitrary and unjustifiable").
32 Id., TBT Agreement, art. 2.1.
33 Id., Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 2(d).
34 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 2(2).
35 Id., GATS Agreement, art. II; Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 4.
36 Id., GATT 1994, art. III.
37 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988); seeUnited States - Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, Nov.
7, 1989, 36 B.I.A.S.D. 385, 391, para. 5.20. See infra notes 444-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of United States amendments to Section 337 in response to this panel decision.'
38 The panel also found that, unlike intellectual property proceedings in federal district
courts, Section 337 imposed strict time limits, permitted U.S. authorities to issue "general
exclusion" orders barring infringing imports, and did not permit counterclaims. United
States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, 36 B.IAS.D. 385,391, para. 5.20.
39 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIMs Agreement, art. 2, annex (illustrative list).
40 Id., TBT Agreement, art. 2.1.
41 Id., PSI Agreement, art. 2(1).
42 Id., Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 2(d).
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affected, through notice and publication of standards and procedures.
A basic requirement that trade regulations "be published promptly" is
set forth in GATT 1994 Article X.43
The new GATT/WTO agreements typically require more specific
commitments. The agreement on investment measures, for example,
requires signatories to notify the WTO Secretariat of the publications
within which trade-related investment measures may be found.44 The
agreements on services and on sanitary and phytosanitary regulations
each incorporate specific publication requirements and also require
signatories to establish "enquiry points" for dissemination of informa-
tion on covered measures. 45
3. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The GATT/WTO 1994 multilateral agreements also share a dis-
pute settlement mechanism. 46 The procedure allows governments to
enforce other countries' commitments through government-to-govern-
ment consultations and a legalistic arbitration under WTO auspices. 47
The arbitration results in a final panel or appellate body report that
must be adopted absent a contrary consensus. 48 If the losing party
does not then bring its offending practices into GATT/WTO conform-
ity, the ultimate penalty is suspension of benefits. 49 The total process
takes two and one-half years.50
Some of the agreements have special dispute settlement provi-
sions that preempt these general rules in some circumstances. 51 For
example, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(Subsidies Agreement) authorizes accelerated dispute settlement pro-
cedures to challenge suspected provision of prohibited or actionable
subsidies. 52
Nevertheless, the application of the general mechanism to all
WTO signatories and agreements, its tightened deadlines and the new
requirement of mandatory adoption of panel reports are viewed as sig-
43 Id., GATT 1994, art. X.
44 Id., TRIMs Agreement, art. 6.
45 Id., GATS Agreement, art. 3; Id., SPS Agreement, art. 7, annex B.
46 Id., DSU.
47 Id., DSU arts. 4, 6-16.
48 Id., DSU art. 16.
49 Id., art. 22.
50 Id., arts. 4.7, 20, 21.3.
51 Article 1.2 of the DSU provides that "special or additional rules or procedures" for
dispute settlement in agreements enumerated in Appendix 2 should prevail over those of the
DSU. Id., DSU art. 1.2. Appendix 2 lists the particular agreements and articles containing
special rules, including the agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, antidump-
ing, subsidies and countervailing measures, textiles, technical barriers and services. Id., DSU,
art. 1.2, app. 2. The Uruguay Round, hence, did not fully resolve the issue of balkanization
of dispute settlement procedures. See EVANS & WAISH, supra note 8, at 46-47.
52 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agreement, arts. 4, 7.
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nificant Uruguay Round accomplishments. 53 They establish an inte-
grated system of dispute settlement with more prompt and effective
resolution than previously existed under the GATT.
D. Special Flexibility for Developing Countries
The GATT/WTO 1994 agreements incorporate two types of provi-
sions that give special flexibility to developing countries-graduated
standards and leniency in the timing of implementation. These varia-
tions highlight the need for particular caution when assessing the prac-
tices of a given trading partner in Latin America; Mexico and all
countries in Central and South America are presently assigned "devel-
oping country" status by the WTO. 54
1. Graduated Standards
Nearly all of the agreements provide for "special and differential"
treatment for developing and least developed countries.55 The agree-
ments on agriculture (Agriculture Agreement),56 sanitary and
phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement),57 textiles and clothing (Tex-
tiles Agreement),58 technical barriers (TBT Agreement), 59 TRIMs, 6°
antidumping, 61 subsidies and countervailing measures (Subsidies
Agreement),62 safeguards, 63 services (GATS),64 and TRIPs65 all give
developing and least-developed countries some added flexibility in
standards or their implementation.
For example, the Agriculture Agreement calls for less drastic cuts
in subsidy levels by developing than by developed countries, and ex-
empts least-developed countries from reduction commitments. 66 The
SPS Agreement allows developing countries to request "specified, time-
53 See, e.g., Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lauryers Triumph
over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 399-403 (Summer 1995); H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3,
at 1008.
54 The agreements themselves do not identify which countries fall into these categories.
The GATT/WTO, however, maintains a list of "developing" and "least developed" countries,
which is available from the Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO, in
Geneva.
55 One of the general principles governing the Uruguay Round negotiations was the
principle of differential and more favorable treatment for developing countries and special
attention to the needs of least developed countries. See MINISTEmIAL DECLARATION ON THE
URUGUAY RouND, reprinted in 3 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-
92), at 3 (Terrence P. Stewart, ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND].
56 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, arts. 9.4, 15, 16.
57 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 10.
58 Id., Textiles Agreement, art. 6.5.
59 Id., TBT Agreement, art. 12.
60 Id., TRIMs Agreement, art. 4.
61 Id., Antidumping Agreement, art. 15.
62 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 27, annex VII.
63 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 9.
64 d., GATS, art. IV.
65 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 65, 66.
66 See Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under the
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limited exceptions in whole or part" from obligations under that agree-
ment;67 the TBT Agreement allows developing countries not to use
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations; 68 and
the Subsidies Agreement raises the threshold for maintaining a coun-
tervailing duty action against developing countries from subsidies ex-
ceeding 1% of the given product's value to 2%.69 Each agreement
must be consulted for its unique "special and differential treatment"
provisions.
2. Timing Considerations
Variations in timing affect the GATT/WTO 1994 commitments of
all WTO members, but most especially those of developing and least-
developed countries. Commitments in many of the agreements have
multi-year implementation schedules. For example, the tariff conces-
sions are actually phase-downs to take place in five equal annual
stages. 70 All WTO members may delay implementing their obligations
under the TRIPs Agreement (except for national treatment and MFN)
for one year, but least-developed country members have a ten-year
grace period. 71 The SPS Agreement permits "longer time frames" for
compliance by developing countries with new SPS measures.
72
Some of the agreements also have "sunset provisions," which pro-
vide for the automatic expiration of certain terms of the agreements
after a given period of time. For example, under the Agriculture
Agreement, exemptions of agricultural support programs from coun-
tervailing duty action or challenge under the WTO last only for nine
years. 73 Specific financial services commitments were open for further
modification or withdrawal for six months after the WTO's effective
date of January 1, 1995, and have been modified by subsequent
negotiations.74
Thus, although the effective date of the WTO Agreement was Jan-
uary 1, 1995, not all of the commitments sprang into life as of that date
or gained permanent status.
E. Rules Affecting Trade in Goods
Many of the GATr/WTO 1994 commitments relate to trade in
Reform Programme, MTN. GNG/MA/W/24 (Dec. 20, 1993), 13-20 [hereinafter
Modalities].
67 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, SPS Agreement, art. 10.3.
68 Id., TBT Agreement, aft. 12.4. :
69 Id., Subsidies Agreement, arts. 11.9, 27.10.
70 Id., Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 2.
71 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 65, 66.
72 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 10.2.
73 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 13.
74 See infra notes 239, 246-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of financial serv-
ices negotiations.
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goods. The WTO Agreement, as discussed, 75 annexes the GATT 1994
plus twelve other multilateral agreements, building on core tariff con-
cessions with disciplines on customs valuation and rules of origin, sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers, preshipment
inspection, import licensing, investment measures, dumping, subsidies
and safeguards. 76 Key provisions of these agreements are detailed
below.
1. Tariff Reductions and Bindings
As in previous negotiating rounds, the core negotiations in the
Uruguay Round involved tariffs.77 Each country's individual tariff
schedules reflect the results of these negotiations, in voluminous,
product-by-product listings of tariff commitments. 78 These individual
country schedules must be consulted to determine the effect of the
Uruguay Round on a given country's tariffs on particular products. In
general, though, the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations had three
results.
First, tariffs were reduced. Developed countries' tariffs on indus-
trial products went from the pre-Round average of 6.4% to 4.0%. 7 9
The biggest reductions affected textiles and clothing; these tariffs de-
clined from a 15.5% pre-Uruguay Round average to 12.4%.80 Since
these cuts are to take place in five equal, annual stages, 81 imports in
1995 are subject to the first set of reductions.
Second, most import tariffs were "bound." Bindings-enforced by
the dispute settlement mechanism-ensure that once agreed to, tariff
levels will not be increased. 82 As a result of the Uruguay Round, the
value of all developed countries' imports with bound tariffs rose from
94% to 98%.83 In combination, the reductions and bindings have re-
sulted in tariffs bound at zero levels on 17% of industrial goods im-
ported into developed countries and 19% of the same goods imported
into developing countries.8 4 Accordingly, Latin American tariffs have
75 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
76 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, annex IA.
77 See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tariff reduction in
previous rounds.
78 Country schedules are available through the WTO Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland
and its United States agent, Unipub (telephone 800-274-4888), and through the United
States National Technical Information Service (telephone 703-487-4650).
79 EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 73; see supra note 8.
80 EVANS & WALSIi, supra note 8, at 73. In addition to textiles and clothing, the largest
overall absolute tariff cuts were in leather, rubber and footwear, and chemicals. Id. at 75-76.
81 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, 2.
82 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. II(1);JAcKSON, THE WORLD TtADING SYSTEM, supra
note 2, at 118-19.
83 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 72.
84 Id. at 72-73.
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also been bound at lower levels, although they can still be substantial. 85
Third, the Round reduced the extent to which tariffs increase with
the stage of production, a phenomenon known as escalation.86 De-
escalation is a particular benefit for developing countries. As they di-
versify, developing countries move their exports up the ladder of
traded goods from raw materials to semi-manufactures and finished
products. De-escalation permits these higher value-added goods to be
exported to the developed countries that would use them. 87
The tariff treatment of agricultural products was part of the agri-
culture agreement negotiations.88 Agricultural imports into the
United States and elsewhere have been subject to a wide variety of quo-
tas and other restrictions, which have now been converted to tariff
equivalents in the "tariffication" process. 89 This process was compli-
cated by minimum market access commitments for particular prod-
ucts.90 Thus, typically WTO members have replaced an agricultural
product quota with a "tariff-rate quota," under which in-quota imports
enter at lower tariff rates than over-quota imports.91 Once a country
converts a quota or other restriction to tariffs, it may not revert to the
non-tariff measure. 92
Tariffs on agricultural imports may still be high, including in the
United States, Mexico and Latin America.93 They must be reduced,
however, by an average of 36% over a six-year implementation period
85 As a result of the Uruguay Round, Chile agreed to reduce its tariffs to 25%; Colombia
bound most of its tariff rates at 35-40% and also subjects most non-agricultural products to a
14% value added tax; and Venezuela bound most of its rates at 35-40%. 1995 USTR NAT'L
TRADE ESTIMATE REP. ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 43, 67, 313 [hereinafter NTE REPORT].
Argentina has a tiered tariff schedule with a maximum rate of 20% and average rate of 10%.
Id. at 9. Brazil's maximum tariff level is 20%, except for automobiles, computers, digital
electronics products, and some capital goods. Id. at 23. Peru has a two-tier tariff structure
with a 15% duty on most imports and 25% duty on the rest. Id. at 257. Most Mexican tariffs
are between 10% and 20%, and under NAFTA will be phased out as to products imported
from Canada or the United States within 15 years. Id. at 9, 229.
86 See EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 74; THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at
18.
87 EVANS & WALSH, supra note 8, at 74.
88 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, art. 4; THE GATT URU-
GUAY ROUND, sUpra note 55, at 18-19, 33-36, 206-26, 615-89.
89 See H.L Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, art. 4; THE GAIT URU-
GUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at 138-39; H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, at 711-12, Statement
of Administrative Action (SAA) at 55-56. These restrictions include variable import levies,
minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, state trading restrictions and volun-
tary export restraints. Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 4.2, n.1.
90 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, art. 4.
91 Id. at 711-12, SAA at 55-56.
92 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 4.2.
93 Peru, for example, has imposed a "temporary" surcharge on six basic agricultural
commodities since 1991, and it also imposes a 15% ad valorem tariff on agricultural prod-
ucts. Chile and Colombia maintain "price band" systems on various agricultural commodi-
ties, under which variable surcharges (in addition to the tariff) are computed based on
international price quotations; the purpose is to maintain domestic prices for the products
within a predetermined range. NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 43, 69, 257, 315.
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(24% by developing countries), 94 and they are also now bound.95
2. Valuation and Rules of Origin
Customs duties are usually assessed on an "ad valorem" basis, that
is, as a percentage of the import's entered value.96 A key issue in cross-
border trading, thus, is the entered value of imported goods. Varying
customs rules around the globe have meant that exporters have been
subject to different calculations of value for the same item, depending
on the distribution of the good.97
The new GATT/WTO agreement on customs valuation addresses
this problem by confirming "transaction value"-defined as the "price
actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export"-as the
preferred valuation basis. 98 The agreement also elaborates on the cal-
culation of transaction value and alternative valuation methods,9 9 and
covers related subjects such as information collected from foreign sup-
pliers.100 Although developing countries may delay application of the
agreement for up to five years,101 the agreement should bring greater
uniformity and certainty to the importing process.
One fundamental customs issue, however, remains a significant
source of confusion-rules of origin. The rules assigning economic
"origin" to a good determine whether it qualifies for preferential tariff
rates (such as under NAFTA) and how non-preferential policies, such
as marking requirements and tariff-rate quotas, apply to it.102 Stan-
dards for determining origin, unfortunately, vary significantly, both
across countries and within the same country.' 0 3 For example, the ba-
sic test of origin for processed goods under NAFTA is whether the
processing resulted in a change of the good's tariff classification. ' 04 In
contrast, to qualify for duty-free treatment under the Andean Trade
Preference Act (ATPA), at least 35% of the value of the good must be
added in an Andean country.10 5
A new agreement on rules of origin takes important initial steps
94 Modalities, supra note 66, 1 5, 15.
95 Modalities, supra note 66, 1 7.
96 See SAUL L. SHERMAN & HINRICH GLASHOFF, CUSTOMS VALUATION: COMMENTARY ON
THE GATT CUSTOMS VALUATION CODE 51 (1988).
97 See gnerally H.R. Doc. No 316, supra note 3, at 898, SAA at 226.
98 Id., Valuation Agreement, art. 1 (1). The United States already uses transaction value
as the preferred basis for valuation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a) (1) (A) (1988).
99 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Valuation Agreement, arts. 1-3, 5-7, annex I.
100 Id., Valuation Agreement, art. 6(2); see also id., Valuation Agreement, art. 10 (relating
to the disclosure of confidential information).
101 Id., Valuation Agreement, art. 20.
102 Non-preferential uses of rules of origin also include the application of MFN treat-
ment, antidumping and countervailing duties, safeguard measures, quantitative restrictions,
government procurement and trade statistics. See id., Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 1.
103 See id. at 902, SAA at 230.
104 See infra notes 297-305 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NAFTA's ori-
gin rules.
105 See infra notes 475-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ATPA.
1995]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
toward harmonization, but leaves actual harmonization to a WTO work
program over the next three years.10 6 It focuses only on non-preferen-
tial applications of origin rules, a significant limitation in light of the
recent proliferation of regional free-trade areas built on the notion of
regional preferences. 10 7 The mandate for the work program is to de-
velop harmonized origin definitions, based on the concepts of "wholly
obtained" goods and "substantial transformation" marked by a change
in tariff classification.108 Certain basic principles apply in the
meantime, including procedures for obtaining a ruling on origin
within 150 days of request. 10 9
3. Sanitary and Technical Barriers
Two of the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements address government
standards applied to restrict imports-the SPS Agreement and the
TBT Agreement. 11 0 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical
measures are among the most pernicious of trade barriers, in that
there is rarely an obvious distinction between legitimate product stan-
dards and protectionist measures. For example, a country may cite the
risk of an agricultural pest to support a particular SPS measure, but in
reality the risk is unfounded and the real purpose of the measure is to
protect domestic producers.1 11 Technical requirements can similarly
be used to disguise trade restrictions.1 12 Agreements on the use of SPS
and technical requirements in regulating imports helps prevent these
types of measures from undoing the results of tariff and other market
access concessions.' 1 3
The SPS and TBT Agreements divide government standards into
those dealing with health and disease risks-SPS measures-and those
dealing with technical product requirements. The SPS Agreement
deals with the first category,1 14 and the TBT Agreement addresses the
second.1 15 Both, however, approach the issue of government stan-
dards in similar ways.
Most fundamentally, both agreements recognize the right of gov-
ernments to impose legitimate measures. Governments are not barred
from taking necessary steps to protect human, animal or plant life or
106 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 9.
107 See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of customs unions and
free trade areas.
108 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 9(2) (c). In the
United States, the International Trade Commission is in the process of developing proposals
for the Administration's continuing negotiations on origin. See International Harmonization
of Customs Rules of Origin, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,339 (1995).
109 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 2(h).
110 Id., annex 1A.
111 See id. at 743, SAA at 87.
112 See id. at 776, SAA at 120.
113 See id. at 743, SAA at 87.
114 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 1, annex A(1).
115 Id., TBT Agreement, art. 1, annex 1(1), (2).
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health; they are also not barred from maintaining product standards
and procedures to produce conformity with those standards. 1 16
Second, both agreements establish rules to help distinguish legiti-
mate standards from protectionist measures and to harmonize stan-
dards and procedures among WTO members. Accordingly, the
agreements require that SPS and technical measures be based on inter-
national standards or guidelines where they exist;' 17 be made transpar-
ent (through notice and publication requirements);' 18 be applied only
to the extent necessary to achieve the objective in question; 1 9 and be
subject to dispute settlement procedures of the WTO.1 20 Developing
countries are entitled to more favorable treatment, such as through
eligibility for time-limited exceptions from agreement obligations. 12 1
These two agreements also embody the principle of "equiva-
lence."1 2 2 Equivalence means that an exporting country must be given
the opportunity to show that its SPS or technical standards are
equivalent to those of the importing territory, even though they are
different (and, presumably, appear to provide less stringent stan-
dards). 123 In effect, equivalence removes differences in country meas-
ures as a justification for barring imports.
The main variance between the agreements is their tests of protec-
tionistic purpose. The TBT Agreement relies primarily on whether a
given measure discriminates among imported products or between im-
ported and domestic products-the essence of MFN and national
treatment.1 24 Because pest and disease risks differ among countries,
however, the same strict non-discrimination requirement is not appro-
priate for SPS measures. Hence, the key obligation in the SPS Agree-
ment is to base measures on scientific principles and a risk
assessment. 125 As to discrimination, the SPS Agreement requires only
that SPS measures not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate" be-
tween importing countries "where identical or similar conditions
prevail."1 26
The problems the SPS and TBT Agreements address are quite rel-
evant to U.S.-Mexico and Latin American trade, especially trade involv-
ing agricultural products. At present, several Latin American countries
116 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 2(1); id., TBT Agreement, art. 2; see id. at 743, 776, SAA at
87, 120.
117 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 3(1); id., TBT Agreement, art. 2.4.
118 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 7; id., TBT Agreement, arts. 2.9, 2.11, 10.
119 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 2(2); id., TBT Agreement, arts. 2.2, 2.3.
120 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 11; id., TBT Agreement, art. 14.
121 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 10; id., TBT Agreement, art. 12.
122 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 4; id., TBT Agreement, art. 2(7).
123 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 4; id., TBT Agreement, art. 2(7).
124 Id., TBT Agreement, art. 2.1; see supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of MFN and national treatment.
125 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, SPS Agreement, art. 2(2); see id. at 742, 776, SAA at
86, 120.
126 Id., SPS Agreement, art. 2(3).
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are involved in prominent standards-related issues with the United
States, principally involving agricultural products. Among these is
Chile, which the United States has recently cited for using non-trans-
parent SPS measures against poultry and fruit imports; Mexico, whose
SPS standards have created issues concerning the access of imported
potatoes, cherries and cling peaches; and Venezuela, which has re-
fused sanitary certificates for United States beef, hogs and pork prod-
ucts, and poultry and poultry products.1 27 Consequently, the SPS and
TBT Agreements have the potential for significantly reducing U.S.-
Latin American standards-related trade friction.
4. Preshipment Inspection and Import Licensing
Other GATT/WTO 1994 agreements address preshipment inspec-
tion and import licensing. These are the Agreement on Preshipment
Inspection (PSI Agreement) 128 and Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures (Import Licensing Agreement). 129
Preshipment inspection typically involves commercial inspection
companies hired by the importing government to verify, before export,
the quality, quantity, price and other terms of shipment.130 The conse-
quent delay and potential for harassment can obstruct exporting.131
Import licensing can also hamper exports, particularly in "non-
automatic systems;" these systems involve administration of quotas or
similar restrictions and approval of only a limited number of applica-
tions.1 32 For example, Colombia's perceived protection of the agricul-
ture sector in part through an import licensing system has drawn
United States government criticism.133
The GATT/WTO agreements on preshipment inspection and im-
port licensing do not bar these procedures.' 3 4 Rather, they establish
procedures and requirements for increasing the speed, simplicity and
transparency of these measures. 135 Enforcement is available, again,
through WTO dispute settlement.136
127 NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 43, 232, 315.
128 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, annex IA.
129 Id.
130 See id., PSI Agreement, art. 1(3).
131 See EvANs & WALSH, supra note 8, at 58.
132 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Import Licensing Agreement, art. 3.
133 NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 68. Import licensing also still poses occasional diffi-
culties for exporters to Brazil. Mexico's import licensing requirements, however, were con-
verted to tariff-rate quotas as part of the NAFTA agricultural provisions. Id. at 23, 230. See
infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of NAFrA's agricultural provisions.
134 H.L Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, PSI Agreement, art. 2; id., Import Licensing Agree-
ment, art. 1.
135 Id., PSI Agreement, art. 2; id., Import Licensing Agreement, art. 3.
136 Id., PSI Agreement, art. 8; id., Import Licensing Agreement, art. 6.
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5. Investment Measures
Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) are government re-
strictions on the ability of foreign interests to invest in the production
of goods. Minimum local content requirements for locally produced
goods, local equity requirements, foreign exchange restrictions, "trade-
balancing" (demands that a company's exports equal the value of its
imports) and any other condition placed by a government on a com-
pany that wishes to operate within its borders are all types of TRIMs. 137
The Uruguay Round brought TRIMs within GATT/WTO disci-
plines for the first time.' 38 The TRIMs Agreement calls for greater
transparency and application of GATT/WTO dispute settlement to in-
vestment measures affecting the production of goods.' 39 It prohibits
two general types of measures: those inconsistent with national treat-
ment 140 and those inconsistent with the obligation to eliminate quanti-
tative restrictions set forth in GATT 1994 Articles III and XI.14 ' The
first type-conditions offending national treatment-includes local-
content and "trade-balancing" requirements.1 42 The second-condi-
tions inconsistent with obligations on quantitative restrictions-in-
cludes domestic sales requirements and foreign exchange
restrictions.1 43 Measures in both categories must be notified and
phased out within two to seven years, depending on the country's eco-
nomic categorization.14
The prohibited measures are more common to developing than
developed countries; the latter rely more commonly on positive incen-
tives to investment such as subsidies and grants. 145 As the TRIMs
Agreement is implemented, it should help eliminate some of the barri-
ers to foreign investment in Latin America, which now include local-
content and foreign equity restrictions, and like measures, in Brazil,
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. 46
6. Antidumping Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Measures
Among the most important of the multilateral agreements on the
trade of goods are four that address special duties or other import re-
137 See EvANs & WALSH, supra note 8, at 32. Auto parts and chemical manufacturers are
among the industries most likely to be affected by TRIMs. Id. at 33.
138 See generally I THE GATIT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at 102 (noting that the
impetus for negotiations on TRIMs evolved over a long period).
139 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIMs Agreement, arts. 6, 8.
140 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing national treatment
obligation).
141 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIMs Agreement, art. 2; see EvANs & WALSH, supra
note 8, at 35; H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, at 833, SAA at 163.
142 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIMs Agreement, annex (illustrative list).
143 Id.
144 Id., TRIMs Agreement, art. 5.
145 See EvANs & WALSH, supra note 8, at 36.
146 See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 28, 45, 235, 317.
1995]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
strictions imposed on top of normal customs duties. The Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement), Subsidies Agreement,
portions of the Agriculture Agreement, and the Agreement on Safe-
guards (Safeguards Agreement) 147 establish requirements and proce-
dures applicable to antidumping,148 countervailing duty,149 and
safeguard actions. 150
a. Antidumping
Antidumping actions involve allegations of dumped imports injur-
ing domestic producers; "dumped" means that export sales prices are
below "normal" value based on prices in the exporting or a third coun-
try, or based on cost of production. 5 1 In an antidumping action, a
government investigates imports of a stated product and country, typi-
cally on the application of a complaining domestic industry.' 52 If the
investigating authority determines that imports have been dumped
and are causing or threaten to cause material injury to domestic com-
petitors, it will impose import measures.' 53 Hence, the GATT/WTO
prohibits only dumping that is injurious. 154
Before the Uruguay Round, a GATT Antidumping Code (An-
tidumping Code) set out the basic principles and procedures for apply-
ing antidumping duties. 155 The new Antidumping Agreement, which
replaces the Antidumping Code, continues to permit antidumping
measures only in response to injurious dumping, and still defines
dumping as export sales prices below those in the home market (or a
third country), with cost as a floor.156 However, the new agreement
contains far more extensive detail than the Antidumping Code on how
each price and cost element is to be calculated and compared. 157 It
also establishes procedural safeguards. Principal procedural improve-
ments include minimum industry shares to be represented by domestic
producers that petition for an antidumping investigation (25% of total
domestic production); 58 immediate termination of cases when the
margin of dumping or volume of imports is de minimis (defined as 2%
147 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, annex IA.
148 See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 162-84 and accompanying text.
150 See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
151 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATT 1994, art. VI; id., Antidumping Agreement,
arts. 2.1, 2.2, 3.
152 Id., Antidumping Agreement, arts. 1-13.
153 Id. The duties are a permitted exception from the core GATT obligations of tariff
bindings and MFN. SeeJACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 2, at 409, 411, 421.
154 SeeJACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 2, at 412-14.
155 See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE, AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE VI (1979) [hereinafter Antidumping Code].
156 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Antidumping Agreement, art. 2.
157 See, e.g., id., Antidumping Agreement, arts. 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.4.
158 Id., Antidumping Agreement, art. 5.4. This is the "standing" requirement.
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and 3%, respectively); 159 and termination of orders within five years
under a "sunset" provision, unless recurring dumping and injury can
be shown.1 60 The agreement will also apply to all WTO members, a far
wider effect than the Antidumping Code, which by 1992 had been
adopted by only twenty-five of. the then ninety-six GATT members.1 61
b. Countervailing Duty
Countervailing duty actions deal with allegations of unfairly subsi-
dized imports that are injuring domestic producers.1 62 Countervail-
able subsidies are typically defined as export subsidies or other
government financial contributions that confer a benefit.163 As with
dumping actions, countervailing duties typically follow an application
by domestic producers, investigation by government authorities and af-
firmative determinations of unfair subsidization and injurious ef-
fect.164 The duties are imposed as an exception to GATT tariff
bindings and MFN. 165
The Subsidies Agreement also replaces a pre-Uruguay Round Sub-
sidies Code (Subsidies Code). 166 The new agreement contains much
more extensive detail than the Subsidies Code, however, on identifying
and measuring countervailable subsidies,1 67 and it will affect far more
countries than the twenty-four that joined the earlier Subsidies
Code.1 68
One of the most important new provisions is that the agreement
defines actionable subsidies for the first time, as government conferral
of a financial benefit.1 69 It makes clear that the amount of the subsidy
is usually to be measured by the benefit to the recipient, not the cost to
the government.' 70 The Subsidies Agreement also establishes proce-
dural safeguards very similar to those in the Antidumping
Agreement.17'
159 Id., Antidumping Agreement, art. 5.8.
160 Id., Antidumping Agreement, art. 11.3.
161 See 1992 GATI AcTxvrrmEs, annex IV, at 173-75 (1993) (24 countries had accepted the
Antidumping Code at the time of publication and another had signed the Antidumping
Code with acceptance still pending).
162 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATT 1994, art. VI; id., Subsidies Agreement, arts.
1.1, 11.2.
163 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 1.1.
164 Id., Subsidies Agreement, arts. 11-19.
165 SeeJAGCSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 2, at 409, 411.
166 See GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TARIUrs AND TRADE, AGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ARTICLES VI, XVI, AND XXIII OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE (1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
167 See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agreement, arts. 1-2, 8, 14, an-
nexes II-V.
168 See 1992 GATT Acr'rrms, annex IV, at 173-75 (1993).
169 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agreement, art. 1.1.
170 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 14.
171 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 11. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the procedural safeguards in the Antidumping Agreement. The Subsidies
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Unlike the Antidumping Agreement, however, the Subsidies
Agreement carves out a category of practices protected from chal-
lenge. In an innovative "traffic light" approach, the agreement defines
prohibited (red), actionable (yellow), and permitted (green) subsi-
dies.' 72 WTO members agree not to grant or maintain subsidies con-
tingent on export or on the use of domestic over imported goods, the
red light category.' 73 They agree not to use any subsidy that causes
adverse effects to the interest of other WTO members, the yellow light
category. 174 In the permitted or green light category are four types of
subsidies: non-specific subsidies (subsidies that are not limited to a
particular enterprise, industry or group); certain types of research and
development; assistance to disadvantaged regions; and one-time assist-
ance for adaptation to new environmental requirements. 175 Breach of
the red and yellow light categories exposes the offending country to an
accelerated GATI'/WTO dispute settlement process or countervailing
duty measures. 176 Use of green light subsidies, though, is generally
without risk of multilateral remedies or national countervailing duty
measures, although the protection is not absolute.' 77
The Agriculture Agreement supplements these disciplines with
rules and remedies that apply only to agriculture subsidies.' 78 With
special standards for developing countries, WTO members agree not
to provide new export subsidies and to reduce existing export subsi-
dies at specified rates, the red light category. 179 Export programs con-
Agreement has the same standing and sunset provisions as the Antidumping Agreement, but
its de minimis threshold for maintaining an action against imports from a developed country
is 1% for level of subsidies. The Subsidies Agreement does not state a de minimis threshold
for volume of imports from a developed country, though presumably that threshold is 3%,
the same as for an antidumping case. H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agreement,
arts. 11.4, 11.9, 21.3. The de minimis cut-offs for an action against a developing country are
2% and 4%, for level of subsidies and volume of subsidized imports. Id., Subsidies Agree-
ment, art. 27.10.
172 See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, at 914-20, SAA at 242-248; EVANS & WALsH, ,uPra
note 8, at 42-45.
173 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agreement, art. 3.
174 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 5.
175 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 8.
176 Id., Subsidies Agreement, arts. 4, 6.
177 Id., Subsidies Agreement, art. 9 (consultations and authorized remedies if notified
green program causes serious adverse effects).
178 See id., Agriculture Agreement, arts. 6-13, annex 2; id., at 716, SAA at 60; see also EVANS
& WAISH, supra note 8, at 17-22. Subsidies that cover both agriculture and non-agriculture
would be subject to the Subsidies Agreement disciplines and remedies.
179 H.R. Doc. No 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, arts. 8, 9. Over a six-year
implementation period that startedJanuary 1, 1995, budgetary outlays for and the quantities
of subsidized exports of developed countries will be reduced by 36% and 21%, respectively,
from 1986-1990 base period levels. Id., Agriculture Agreement, arts. l(f), 9.2. Developing
countries need reduce their outlays for and quantities of export subsidies by 24% and 14%,
and are exempt from commitments relating to: (1) subsidies that reduce the costs of market-
ing exports of agricultural products; and (2) "internal transport and freight charges on ex-
port shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favorable than for
domestic shipments." Id., Agriculture Agreement, arts. 9.2, 9.4.
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sistent with these commitments, though, may still be countervailed and
subject to GATT action.' 8 0
In the intermediate or yellow light category are domestic subsidies
providing de minimis benefits or involving direct payments to produc-
tion-limiting programs. 18 ' These may still be countervailed but with
one proviso are exempt from actions under the GATT for nine
years.' 8 2
Green light status is accorded to a wide array of programs other
than those providing price support, including general services such as
research or pest and disease control, income support if not tied to pro-
duction or price, disaster insurance, income safety nets and many
others.18 3 These green light programs enjoy a nine-year period of non-
actionability under the GATT/WTO and under national counter-
vailing duty laws. 184
c. Safeguards
Safeguard actions (known in the United States as the "escape
clause") target increased levels of imports that cause or threaten injury
to the competing domestic producers.' 85 Unlike antidumping and
countervailing duty actions, safeguard actions involve no allegations of
unfair trading practices-just of increased imports combined with
injury.186
The Safeguards Agreement for the first time applies detailed rules
to quotas and other safeguard measures. Existing measures must be
phased out within the later of five years of the entry into force of the
WTO, or eight years of imposition of the safeguard. 187 Any new meas-
ures must be non-discriminatory, 188 time-limited' 89 and not applied
successively to the same product without a breathing period.' 90 Prod-
ucts from developing countries are exempt from safeguard action if
they have small shares of imports. 9 1 Special safeguard rules apply to
agricultural and textile imports under those separate agreements.' 92
180 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 13(c).
181 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 6.
182 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 13(b). The proviso is that support to a specific com-
modity not exceed the 1992 marketing year level. Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 13(b).
183 Id., Agriculture Agreement, annex 2. Other types of programs eligible for greenbox
status include structural adjustment assistance provided through producer or resource retire-
ment programs or investment aids, and environmental and regional assistance programs. Id.
184 Id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 13(a).
185 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 2; id., GATT 1994, art. XIX.
186 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 2.
187 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 10.
188 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 2(2).
189 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 7.
190 Id., Safeguards Agreement, arts. 7(5), 7(6).
191 Id., Safeguards Agreement, art. 9. The developing country's share of.imports must
exceed 3% and those with import shares below that amount must collectively account for
more than 9% of total imports. Id.
192 See id., Agriculture Agreement, art. 5; id., Textiles Agreement, art. 6.
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d. Effect on U.S.-Latin American Trade
Antidumping laws, countervailing duty laws, and safeguards are
potent trade weapons. Their cost is not only the actual duties or other
import measures that are imposed, but also the potential loss of access
to an entire market if duties are too high, business uncertainty created
by the proceedings and border disruptions.
The United States has been one of the major users of these ac-
tions. From 1990-94, the United States initiated some 246 new an-
tidumping investigations, forty-nine countervailing duty actions and
two safeguard actions-a number of these against Mexico and Latin
America. 193 Unfortunately, the United States fondness for these ac-
tions has been increasingly mirrored by other countries, including
those in Mexico and Latin America.194
As United States exports to those areas increase, so does the po-
tential for unfair trade actions or safeguard measures against United
States products. 19 5 At the same time, imports from those areas to the
United States will continue to be susceptible to United States action,
particularly if Latin American economies achieve export growth
through government assistance and aggressive pricing; these types of
practices provide fertile ground for allegations of dumping or unfair
subsidization. Mexico and Brazil, for example, are already among the
most sued under United States trade laws.196
193 Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, Remarks by
Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade before the American Bar Association
(Apr. 28, 1994). See infra notes 401-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of United
States antidumping actions against Latin America.
194 Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela currently have some form of an-
tidumping and anti-subsidy laws. By far the most active enforcer is Mexico, which revamped
its antidumping and countervailing duty laws in 1993. See Ley de Comercio Exterior, Diario
Official de la Federacion, July 27, 1993, at 50 (promulgation and publication of Foreign Trade
Law) and Diaio Official de la Federacion, Dec. 22, 1993 (promulgation and publication of tech-
nical amendments), translated in 2 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRAoE AGREEMENTS, (James R.
Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds. & Craig R. Giesze trans., 1994). In 1993, Mexico passed
Canada as the fourth most active user of unfair trade laws, outdone only by the United States,
Australia and the European Union. See Craig R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty System: Policy and Legal Implications, As Well As Practical Business Risks and Reali-
ties, for United States Exporters to Mexico in the Era of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25 ST.
MARY'S LJ. 885, 944-52 (1994).
195 American products subject to trade investigations in Mexico in 1994 included beef,
pork, bond paper products, galvanized flat-rolled steel products, cut-to-length carbon steel
plate, and other steel products. The United States is the most frequent target of actions
instituted under the Mexican Foreign Trade Law. See U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, ANTI-DUMPING SUITS: A WEAPON AGAINST FOREIGN COMPETITION IN COUN-
TRIES wrrI Low TARIFF BARRIERS, (article derived from June 22, 1994 report from U.S. Em-
bassy in Mexico City) (available on the National Trade Data Bank).
196 Between 1980 and 1993, 68 United States antidumping and countervailing duty cases
were brought against Brazil. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTER-
VAILING DU-Tv ACTIONS FOR ALL CASES ACTrVE ON OR AFrER JANUARY 1, 1980: A FEDERAL REGIS-
TER HISTORY CURRENT THROUGH JULY 26, 1993. In the same time period, 47 antidumping
and countervailing duty cases were brought against Mexico. See id. Only Japan (103) and
Canada (70) were subject to more investigations than Brazil, while Mexico also fell slightly
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The new agreements will not eliminate these actions. However,
because the new agreements contain much more extensive elaboration
of standards and procedures than the earlier Codes, 197 and must be
accepted by all WTO members, 198 they should make each type of ac-
tion more uniform and transparent. Further, some of the new restric-
tions on safeguard actions, 199 and new agreements to reduce the use
and actionability of subsidies, 200 should reduce the frequency and se-
verity of safeguard and countervailing duty measures over time.
7. Agriculture and Textiles
Agriculture and textiles were among the most contentious negoti-
ations,20 1 but produced some of the most significant achievements of
the Uruguay Round.202 The Agriculture Agreement imposed specific
disciplines on agriculture trade and created the legal framework for
long-term reform of the domestic policies of WTO members.20 3 The
Textiles Agreement produced the largest absolute cuts in tariff levels as
well as a framework for phasing out quotas on textiles and clothing
and integrating those products into the GATT/WTO. 20 4 Because
these sectors represent relatively large parts of developing countries'
economies, their reform in the Uruguay Round should have significant
long-term effects on trade with those countries, including those in
Latin America. 20 5
Key aspects of the Agriculture Agreement have already been men-
tioned-tariffication of quotas,20 6 sanitary and phytosanitary require-
ments, 20 7 export subsidy reduction commitments208 and green light
behind South Korea, Italy and Taiwan. See id. A recent Department of Commerce list shows
13 antidumping and 8 countervailing duty orders in effect against Brazil, and 6 antidumping
and 5 countervailing duty orders in effect against Mexico. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. AN-
TIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING Duiy ORDERS, FINDINGS AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS CUR-
RENTLY IN EFFEcr (1995) [hereinafter DOC ORDERS IN EFFE'r]; see injia note 398 and
accompanying text (discussing United States trade actions).
197 See supra notes 151-61, 162-84, and 185-92 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 22-23, 161, 168 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 172-84, 210-12 and accompanying text.
201 For background on the agriculture negotiations, see I THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 55, at 126-228;Joseph A. McMahon, The Uruguay Round and Agriculture Charting a
New Direction?, 29 INT'L LAw. 411, 417-23 (Summer 1995). For background on the textile
negotiations, see I THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at 255-361.
202 See I The GATT Uruguay Round, supra note 55, at 163; Bello, supra note 23, at 335,
342.
203 See generally McMahon, supra note 201, at 423, 433.
204 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Textiles Agreement, art. 2; see supra note 80 and
accompanying text (discussing tariff cuts).
205 See generally I THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at 163. Approximately one-
quarter of Latin America's merchandise exports in 1992 was in agriculture and about 5% in
textiles and clothing. See 1994 GATT TRENDS AND STATISTICS 31.
206 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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status for certain domestic subsidies.209 In addition, GATT/WTO
members agreed to reduce support for domestic agricultural programs
considered to be trade-distortive, such as price supports, marketing
loans, acreage payments and input subsidies (such as on seed, fertilizer
and irrigation).210 The Agriculture Agreement sets out a methodology
and timetable for quantifying and reducing these types of supports.211
Green light programs are exempted from the reduction
commitments 212
The Textiles Agreement marks the end of the era of quotas im-
posed by the 1974 Multifiber Arrangement.2 13 It requires the phase-
out of all textile and clothing quotas over a ten-year transition period,
primarily by accelerating the growth of existing quota levels.2 1 4 It also
integrates textiles and clothing into the GATT/WTO regime, in four
stages.215 Once a product has been integrated, no import quotas on it
may be maintained other than under normal (and restrictive) GATT
procedures.2 16
F. Rules Affecting Trade in Services
The Uruguay Round included the first multilateral effort to liber-
alize trade in services.2 17 The results in the GATS218 fail to reflect im-
portant decisions in key service areas,219 and negotiations on services-
are continuing.220 Nonetheless, the GATS establishes the first set of
multilateral, enforceable disciplines on trade and investment in the
services sector.
The GATS has general and specific commitments. The core gen-
eral obligation relates to MFN treatment; each "ATO member agrees to
accord "to services and service suppliers of any other member treat-
ment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service
209 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
210 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, art. 6.
211 Id., Agriculture Agreement, annex 3; Modalities, supra note 66, 1 8, 15. Developed
countries must reduce their support by 20% over a six-year period, and developing countries
must reduce their support levels by 13% over 10 years. Id.
212 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Agriculture Agreement, art. 6.1; see supra notes 183-
84 and accompanying text (discussing green light agricultural programs).
213 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001.
214 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Textiles Agreement, arts. 2(4), 2(13)-(14).
215 On January 1, 1995, the date the WTO Agreement entered into force, each Member
integrated into the GATT 1994 at least 16% of its total volume of imports (using 1990 as a
base year) in four categories of textiles and clothing: tops and yarns; fabrics; made-up textile
products; and clothing. Id., Textiles Agreement, art. 2(6). The remaining products will be
integrated into GATr 1994 in three stages: one group of products will be integrated on
January 2, 1998; a second group onJanuary 2, 2002; and the third and final group on January
2, 2005. Id., Textiles Agreement, art. 2(8).
216 Id., Textiles Agreement, art. 2(4).
217 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing Uruguay Round "firsts").
218 H.1L Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, annex lB.
219 See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
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suppliers of any other country."22' Unconditional MFN treatment is
undermined, however, by the GATS provision that allows members to
file exemptions from MFN for particular measures. 222 The exemp-
tions must, in principle, have been filed before entry of the WTO
Agreement (on January 1, 1995), terminate in no more than ten years
and be subject to WTO review every five years. 223
A second core obligation is the GATS demand for transparency in
all service activities.224 Transparency is achieved by publication of "rel-
evant measures of general application" and dissemination of informa-
tion through "enquiry points."22 5 Other significant general GATS
provisions call for domestic regulations that provide for 'judicial, arbi-
tral or administrative" review of administrative decisions affecting trade
in services,226 an increase in the participation of developing countries
in world trade in services227 and application of the GATT/WTO dis-
pute settlement and enforcement mechanism. 228
The real meat of the agreement is in the specific commitments.
As reflected in each country's service schedules, each WTO member
has undertaken commitments in specific sectors. 229 Unless they rec-
ord reservations, the governments assume obligations of full market
access and national treatment in those sectors.2 30 "Full market access"
means that members will not limit the number of service firms allowed
in the market, impose "economic needs" tests, mandate local incorpo-
ration or limit foreign capital investment.231 National treatment
means that foreign services and services suppliers may not be subject to
discriminatory treatment under the importing country's internal taxes,
laws and regulations. 232 As with MFN, though, members may record
conditions and qualifications. 233
The GATS defines its scope broadly. It defines "measures" as in-
cluding those taken by central, regional or local governments and by
"non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by"
221 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATS, art. II(1).
222 Id., GATS, art. 11(2), annex on Article II Exemptions.
223 Id.
224 Id., GATS, art. III.
225 Id., GATS, art. III.
226 Id., GATS, art. VI(2).
227 Id., GATS, art. IV.
228 Id., GATS, art. XXIII.
229 Id., GATS, arts. XVI-XVII. The U.S. International Trade Commission has undertaken
an effort to clarify the service sector commitments by Mexico and several other countries
(not in Latin America). See General Agreement on Trade in Services: Examination of Major
Trading Partners' Schedules of Commitments, 60 Fed. Reg. 6732 (1995). Its final report is
due December 1995.
230 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATS, art. XVI.
231 Id., GATS, art. XVI.
232 Id., GATS, art. XVII; see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
national treatment obligation).
233 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATS, art. XVII(1).
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those governments. 234 It defines "services" as including "any service in
any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental au-
thority."235 General exceptions to obligations permit governments to
apply measures necessary to protect public health or safety, protect na-
tional security and other like purposes. 236
However, annexes to the GATS establish separate and more lim-
ited sets of disciplines applicable to measures affecting natural persons
supplying services,237 air transport services, 238 financial services,2 39
maritime transport240 and telecommunications. 241 The GATS provi-
sions on restrictive business practices merely recognizes that "certain
business practices of service suppliers" may "restrict trade in services,"
and requires only that consultations be entered on particular practices
at the request of another member. 242 The conditions and qualifica-
tions to MFN and national treatment have been noted, 243 as has been
the limitation of market access commitments to the specific sector
commitments made by individual countries.2 44
These and other holes in the GATS coverage highlight the signifi-
cance of continuing multilateral negotiations on services. Indeed,
more than any other GATT/WTO 1994 agreement (except possibly
that on rules of origin), GATS explicitly calls for continuing negotia-
tions in particular areas including the sectors covered by special an-
nexes. 245 Hence, various service negotiations continued post-Uruguay
Round and are ongoing.2 46 These negotiations can be expected to
234 Id., GATS, art. I(3)(a).
235 Id., GATS, art. I(3)(b).
236 Id., GATS, arts. XIV, XIV.
237 Id., GATS, annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the
Agreement.
238 Id., GATS, annex on Air Transport Services.
239 Id., GATS, annex on Financial Services, second annex on Financial Services.
240 Id., GATS, annex on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services.
241 Id., GATS, annex on Telecommunications, annex on Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications.
242 Id., GATS, art. IX.
243 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATS, art. X (calling for further negotia-
tions on emergency safeguard measures);id., GATS, art. XIII (calling for further negotiations
on government procurement in services); id., GATS, art. XV (calling for further negotiations
on developing disciplines on subsidies on services and application of countervailing proce-
dures to services); id., CATS, art. XIX (calling for successive rounds of negotiations to liber-
alize further specific commitments); see supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text discussing
the annexes.
246 Negotiations on the movement of personnel were due to conclude in June 1995, a
deadline later extended to July 28, 1995. See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, CATS, annex
on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement; WI/O's Ongoing
Work Programme in Serices, WTO NEWSLETrER, No. 3, May-June 1995, at 13. At the time this
Article was prepared, no agreement had yet been announced. Negotiations on maritime
transport services and basic telecommunications.are ongoing and due to conclude in 1996.
See id. The initial stage of further negotiations on financial services concluded in July 1995
with an interim agreement under which 30 countries improved on their Uruguay Round
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lead to revised schedules of commitments for some countries.247
Barriers to trade in services have become an increasing source of
friction between the United States and Latin America. The United
States has identified Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Vene-
zuela as maintaining trade barriers of various sorts to different service
sectors.248 The CATS and ongoing service negotiations, thus, should
favorably impact U.S.-Latin American trade.
G. Rules Affecting Intellectual Property Rights
Finally, the TRIPs Agreement extends GATT/WTO disciplines to
intellectual property rights.2 49 It is far from the first multilateral agree-
ment on this subject; the TRIPs Agreement itself recognizes and re-
quires WTO members to apply the pre-existing substantive obligations
of the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions,250 among other interna-
tional treaties. 251 However, it supplements those conventions with ad-
ditional protections. Among the most important of these are the
TRIPs Agreement provisions requiring comprehensive national en-
forcement procedures;252 national treatment (subject to reservations
already existing in the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions and other
treaties);253 MFN;254  transparency;2 55  and GATTI/WTO dispute
settlement.256
The TRIPs Agreement also includes detailed standards of protec-
tion applicable to eight types of intellectual property: patents (cover-
ing products and processes, including plant varieties), 257
trademarks,258 copyrights (including computer programs, recording
artist performances and broadcasts),259 trade secrets, 260 semiconduc-
commitments. See WTO Decisions on Financial Services, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 28,
1995, at 19.
247 The revised schedules are available through the same sources as the original sched-
ules. See supra note 78.
248 See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 10, 27-28, 70-71, 234-35, 317.
249 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIPS Agreement.
250 Id., TRIPS Agreement, arts. 1, 2, 9; see Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, 1967, T.I.A.S. Nos. 6923, 7727; Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961 [here-
inafter Rome Convention].
251 These include the International Convention for the Protection of Performers and
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. H.R. Doc. No. 316,
supra note 3, TRIPs Agreement, arts. 1, 2, 9.
252 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 41-61 (describing, civil, criminal, provisional and border
measures).
253 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 3.
254 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 4.
255 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 63.
256 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 64.
257 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 27-34.
258 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 15-21.
259 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 9-14.
260 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 39.
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tor chip layout designs (mask works),261 industrial designs, 262 geo-
graphical indications2 63 and know-how. 264 In general, the TRIPs
Agreement provides a baseline level of protection; members may im-
prove on the protection as long as they do not violate provisions of the
agreement.265
The TRIPs Agreement also has transition provisions. All countries
have a one-year grace period before applying any provisions. Develop-
ing countries have an additional four years and least-developed an ad-
ditional ten years to apply the substantive provisions (but not national
treatment and MFN). 2 6 6
Intellectual property issues have become the single most common
source of U.S.-Latin American trade friction. 267 Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela have attracted particular atten-
tion because of United States dissatisfaction with their protection of
patents, trademarks and copyrights; Argentina has been designated a
"potential priority foreign country"268 and the others placed on the
United States "watch lists" under the "Special 301" provision of United
States law, some for several years.2 69 Because of the transition periods
for applying the TRIPs Agreement, changes in the intellectual prop-
erty laws of Latin America may not be immediate. As the TRIPs Agree-
261 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 35-38.
262 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 25-26.
263 Id., TRIPs Agreement, arts. 22-24.
264 Id., TRIPs Agreement, art. 40; see generally John T. Masterson, Jr., Protection of Inteec-
tual Property Rights in International Transactions, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKs ON IN.
TERNATIONAl T E AND INVESTMENT 1994, at 333, 363-65 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-863, 1994) (summarizing key TRIPs Agreement features); Richard C.
Wilder, A View of GA7T/TRIPs and NAFTA from the Intellectual Prperty Perspective, in THE COM-
MERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKs ON INTERNATiONAL TRADE AND IN VSTMENT 1994, at 371, 372-91
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B-863, 1994) (summarizing key TRIPs Agree-
ment features).
265 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIPs Agreement, art. 1(1); see Masterson, supra
note 264, at 363.
266 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, TRIPs Agreement, arts. 65-66.
267 In its most recent report on worldwide foreign trade barriers, the United States Gov-
ernment identified intellectual property issues relating to each of the 12 Central and South
American and Caribbean countries identified in the report. NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at
10 (Argentina), 25-27 (Brazil), 44-45 (Chile), 69-70 (Colombia), 73-74 (Costa Rica), 75-76
(Dominican Republic), 84 (El Salvador), 120-21 (Guatemala), 134 (Honduras), 233 (Mex-
ico), 258-59 (Peru) and 316-17 (Venezuela).
268 Notice of Identification of Foreign Countries That Deny Adequate and Effective In-
tellectual Property Protection or Market Access to Persons That Rely on Intellectual Property
Protection, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,341 (1994) (naming Argentina as country posing "particularly
serious problems" requiring review within 60 days of notice to determine whether Argentina
should be named as a priority country). Argentina was also named to the watch list in 1995.
USTR Announcement on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and Intellectual
Property Protection (Special 301), Apr. 29, 1995, reprinted in 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
18, at 791 (May 3, 1995).
269 See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 69 (Colombia on watch list for 1991-1994), 258
(Peru on watch list for 1992-94), 316-17 (Venezuela on watch list); Identification Notice, 59
Fed. Reg. 26,341 (1994) (Chile on watch list for 1994); see infra notes 536-47 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Special 301 and its "watch lists."
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ment is implemented, however, it should help ease this category of
U.S.-Latin American trade barriers.
H. Impact on U.S.-Latin American Trade
Through these many agreements, the Final Act created a single
legal framework for worldwide, enforceable disciplines not only on
trade in goods, but also on trade in services and intellectual property
rights. It carried forward the basic principles of GATT 1947 into a new
GATT 1994, and integrated GATT 1994 with the many other Uruguay
Round agreements. Because these new rules cover virtually all trading
territories and goods and services traded, they will unquestionably af-
fect trade between the United States and Latin America.
III. NAFA and Other Regional Trading Arrangements
A network of regional or subregional trading agreements supple-
ments the rights and obligations of the GATT/WTO for the regions
involved. By their very purpose, these agreements establish preferen-
tial trading rules for the regional signatories, in violation of the MFN
principle.2 70 On the other hand, creation of regional trading blocs
can assist integration on a hemispheric or global basis, by creating ever
larger trading units aggregated into a common legal framework.2 71
In recognition of their integration potential, the GATT permits
two types of regional agreements: customs unions and free trade ar-
eas.2 72 Both eliminate duties and other restrictive trade regulations on
substantially all trade within the bloc.2 73 A customs union also estab-
lishes common external tariffs applied to trading partners not in-
cluded in the union.2 74 Neither may create higher barriers to trade
outside of the bloc than existed before it was formed.2 75
Presently, there are over a dozen customs unions and free trade
areas involving Mexico and Latin America. 276 The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of a free trade area, as
is the Group of Three (G-3).277 MERCOSUR and the Andean Group,
in contrast, aim to establish customs unions including common exter-
270 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of MFN.
271 See generally Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas Since 1948, WTO NEWSLETrER, No. 3,
May/June 1995, at 10-11.
272 H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, GATT 1994, art. XXIV.
273 See id., GATT 1994, art XXIV.
274 Id., GAT 1994, art XXIV(8).
275 Id., GATT 1994, art. XXIV(5).
276 See Garten, supra note 193. These include four customs unions-the Andean Pact,
CARICOM, MERCOSUR and the Colombia-Venezuela customs union-and the following
free trade areas: Group of Three, CACM, Bolivia-Peru, Ecuador-Venezuela, Mexico-Central
America, Colombia-Venezuela-Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela-Central America, Mexico-Costa
Rica, as well as bilateral free trade areas between Chile and Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. Id.
277 See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
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nal tariffs.278 As a practical matter, the overlap of these agreements
with each other, the GATI'/WTO agreements and the numerous bilat-
eral agreements that intersperse these multilateral efforts can create a
seeming maze of customs, trade and investment rules.
2 79
A. NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the most
important regional trade agreement linking the United States and
Latin America.280 It took effectJanuary 1, 1994, among Mexico, Can-
ada and the United States. 281 NAFTA replaced the United States-Can-
ada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), which had been in effect since
1988 and included only the United States and Canada.2 82 NAFTA al-
lows for accession by other countries, and Chile is the first in line.2 8 3
Depending in part on whether Congress extends "fast track" negotiat-
ing authority to the President,284 Chile could be part of NAFTA (pre-
278 See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text (discussing MERCOSUR) and notes
378-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Andean Group).
279 For example, Colombia's tariffs on any given import will depend on whether the
import originates in an Andean Pact member, a G-3 member, a member of another free
trade agreement negotiated with Colombia (including Chile, CARICOM and Panama), an
ALADI member state that has negotiated preferential tariffs with Colombia, a party to a har-
monized policy on a given product (such as Colombia's harmonized automotive policy with
Venezuela and Ecuador), or a WTO member, among other variations. See NTE REPORT,
supra note 85, at 67-68.
280 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement, Implementing Bill,
Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No.
159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
281 Id. at 727, NAFTA, art. 101; Proclamation No. 6641, 3 C.F.R. 172 (1993); Exec. Order
No. 12,889, 3 C.F.R 707 (1993).
282 See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Text of the Agreement, Implement-
ing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988); 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988).
283 H.R. Doc. No. 159, supra note 280, at 1292, NAFTA, art. 2204. In May of 1994, the
Clinton Administration issued the first report on potential NAFTA candidates. USTR, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON SIGNIFICANT MARKET OPENING, (May 1, 1994),
at 1. The Report identified Chile as a prospective NAFTA partner. Id. at 2. Formal negotia-
tions regarding Chile's accession to the NAFTA officially began in June 1995, when Chile and
the NAFTA Members agreed to negotiating schedules. The negotiations are ongoing, and
are expected to conclude by the end of 1995 or early 1996.
In April the International Trade Commission (ITC) initiated a section 332 investigation
of the probable economic effects of Chilean accession to the NAFTA. See Chile: Probable
Economic Effect on U.S. Imports, Industries, Consumers, and Exports of Accession to the
North American Free Trade Agreement and Report on Services Trade, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,851
(1995) (instituting investigation 332-359). That investigation is ongoing.
284 The target date for completing negotiations may be vulnerable because the United
States President does not currently have "fast-track" authority. "Fast-track" refers to a special
process enacted in 1988 to apply to the implementation of trade agreements. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2191, 2903 (1988). Under the fast-track provisions, the President provides Congress with
notice of his intent to enter into a trade agreement, and consults with Congressional commit-
tees about the agreement. Id. § 2902, 2903. Once he has entered into the agreement, the
President submits to Congress the final legal text of the agreement, along with a draft imple-
menting bill, a statement of administrative action, and supporting information. Id. § 2903.
The advantage of fast-track is that Congress may not amend the draft implementing bill once
it is introduced, but rather votes only to accept or reject the agreement. Id. § 2191(d).
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sumably changing that Agreement's name) as early as 1996.285
NAFTA covers the same areas as the GATT/WTO agreements:
trade in goods including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, trade-related invest-
ment measures and special rules for contentious sectors;286 trade in
services;28 7 and intellectual property rights.2 8 It also is grounded on
the same principles as the GATT/WTO, although as applied to the
three signatories: MFN, national treatment, transparency and multilat-
eral dispute settlement. 289 In general, NAFTA applies higher or more
extensive standards than the GATT/WTO. Where the standards con-
flict, NAFTA prevails. 290
1. Trade in Goods
Where the Uruguay Round reduced duties, some to zero, NAFTA
brings all tariffs of goods originating in the NAFTA region to zero
levels. 291 Some tariffs were eliminated as of NAFTA's January 1, 1994
implementation date. 292 The rest will be reduced in equal, annual
stages. 293 Tariffs between the United States or Canada and Mexico will
be reduced over five, ten or fifteen years, generally depending on im-
port sensitivity.2 94 Tariffs between the United States and Canada will
be eliminated by January 1, 1998, in accordance with the original
CFTA phase-out.295 The tariff schedules for the signatories identify
each product's staging category.296
To qualify for these tariff preferences, goods must "originate" in a
NAFTA region, as defined by that Agreement.297 The rules of origin
for this determination are notorious for their complexity. However,
they boil down to four standards.
First, a product qualifies as originating if it is wholly produced in
the NAFTA region, such as crops or minerals.298 Second, most prod-
Hence, the mechanism provides assurance to countries negotiating with the United States
Administration that Congress will not modify or undo the terms of an agreement.
"Fast-track" originally applied to agreements entered into before June 1, 1991. In 1990,
Congress amended the fast-track provisions to apply generally to trade agreements entered
into before June 1, 1993. Id. § 2902. In 1993, Congress enacted a special extension of "fast-
track" for the GATr Uruguay Round agreement. Id. § 2902(e). To date, "fast-track" has not
been extended for any other agreement, including Chile's accession to the NAFMA.
285 See supra notes 283-84.
286 See infra notes 291-338 and accompanying text.
287 See infra notes 339-56 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
289 H.R. Doc. No. 159, supra note 280, at 727, NAFTA, art. 102.
290 Id. at 728, NAFMA, art. 103.
291 Id. at 735, NAFrA, art. 302, annex 302.2.
292 Id. at 735, 763, NAFrA, art. 302, annex 302.2(1)(a).
293 Id. at 735, 763, NAFTA, art. 302, annex 302.2(l)(b)-(e).
294 Id.
295 Id. at 735, 763-66, NAFrA, art. 302, annex 302.2.
296 See id., NAFrA, annex 302.2 (Schedule of the United States); id., NAFrA, annex
302.2 (Schedule of Canada); id., NAFrA, annex 302.2 (Schedule of Mexico).
297 Id. at 735, 885-905, 906-10, NAFMA, arts. 302(2), 401-415, annexes 401, 403.1-403.3.
298 Id. at 885, NAF'A, art. 401(a).
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ucts that contain both NAFTA and non-NAFTA materials can still qual-
ify as originating if each non-NAFTA material undergoes a change in
tariff classification because of processing within the NAFTA region.2 99
Annex 401 to the NAFTA sets out specific guidelines for the change in
tariff classification for each product.300 Third, some products with
mixed NAFTA and non-NAFTA materials are subject to a 50% or 60%
regional value content requirement, in addition to or instead of the
change in tariff classification standard.301 This content requirement
applies primarily in the automotive and chemicals sectors. 30 2 Finally,
goods that cannot meet the change in tariff classification rule because
they were imported unassembled or the imported parts were classified
with the goods must have 50% or 60% regional value content.30 3 Re-
gional content is calculated by the transaction value standard estab-
lished in the customs valuation agreement, or by net cost.30 4 A special
"yarn forward" rule of origin applies to textiles and apparel.30 5
In addition to tariff reductions, NAFTA requires the United States
and Mexico to phase out their customs user fees;3 0 6 prohibits any new
duty waivers that are tied to performance requirements;30 7 limits ex-
port taxes except on Mexican foodstuffs;308 and limits other export
measures.309 It also restricts duty drawback, and duty waivers and re-
ductions under a foreign trade zone, bonded warehouse or maqui-
ladora program that may be claimed on non-NAFTA goods.310 The
point is to prevent these special customs mechanisms from creating an
export platform for non-NAFTA materials traded within the NAFTA
region.311
NAFTA also has provisions addressing technical barriers and sani-
tary and phytosanitary requirements. 3 12 These provisions drew from
299 Id. at 885, NAFTA, art. 401(b).
300 Id. at 885, 1305-1480, NAFTA, art. 401(b), annex 401. There is a de minimis stan-
dard, under which non-NAFrA materials may be disregarded if they constitute seven percent
or less of the good's value. Id. at 893-96, NAFrA, art. 405. Packing and packaging materials,
and spare parts, accessories and tools invoiced with the good, may also be disregarded. Id. at
896-97, NAFTA, arts. 407, 409, 410.
301 Id. at 885, 1306-1462, NAFTA, art. 401(b), annex 401.
302 Id. at 492, Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) at 43.
303 Id. at 885-86, NAFTA, art. 401(d).
304 Id. at 886-90, NAFTA, art. 402.
305 "Yarn forward" means that a garment must be cut and sewn in a NAFTA country and
both the fabric for the garment and the yarn for the fabric must have been manufactured in
a NAFTA country. Id. at 489, SAA at 40.
306 Id. at 743, 787, NAFTA, art. 310, annex 310.1.
307 Id. at 739, NAFrA, art. 304.
308 Id. at 744, 796, NAFTA, art. 314, annex 314.
309 Id. at 739, 743-44, NAFTA, arts. 304, 310, 314-15.
310 Id. at 735-39, NAFTA, art. 303.
311 Id. at 468, SAA at 19.
312 Id. at 971-85, 998-1019, NAFTA, arts. 709-24. The rules on technical barriers also
apply to land transportation services and telecommunications services. Id. at 1012, NAFYA,
art. 915. They do not apply to government procurement. Id. at 998, NAFTA, art. 901.
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the then-draft Uruguay Round texts in these areas,3 13 and generally
mirror those provisions. 3 14
In the investment area, NAFTA establishes more comprehensive
obligations than the GATT/WTO investment agreement. It provides
four basic protections to investors from other NAFTA countries: non-
discrimination (national treatment and MFN);3 1 5 freedom from per-
formance requirements as a condition of investment;3 1 6 unrestricted
transfers of funds related to investments;3 1 7 and conditions on expro-
priation, including the right to compensation at pre-expropriation fair
market value.3 18 There is also a special dispute settlement mechanism
under which investors may submit to binding arbitration any claims
that host governments have breached their NAFTA obligations. 31 9
With respect to antidumping and countervailing duties, NAFTA
does not establish any substantive or procedural standards; rather, it
explicitly allows each country to apply its existing laws to goods im-
ported from other NAFTA territories.32 0 The procedures and stan-
dards set forth in the GATT/WTO 1994 antidumping and subsidies
agreements, thus, apply to NAFTA signatories through their member-
ship in the GATT/WTO.
NAFTA does, though, provide three unique dispute settlement
mechanisms: one for reviewing statutory amendments to antidumping
and countervailing duty laws,32 1 a second for binational panel review
of determinations in particular cases3 22 and a third for safeguarding
the panel review system when one NAFTA party has alleged that an-
other has prevented panel review in a particular case.3 23 These mecha-
nisms, hence, are available to NAFTA parties in addition to GATT/
WTO dispute settlement related to dumping and subsidies.
Finally, as do the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements, NAFTA has spe-
cial provisions relating to trade in agriculture and textiles. For agricul-
ture, the commitments tend to be bilateral and product-specific, and
hence quite complex.3 24 One consequence is that many of the com-
313 Id. at 538, SAA at 89.
314 See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Uruguay Round
agreements on SPS and technical barriers.
315 See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 159, supra note 280, at 734, NAFTA, art. 301. National treat-
ment and MFN provisions appear throughout the NAFrA in the texts of the individual
subagreements. See, e.g., id. at 1099-1100, NAFMA, arts. 1102-03.
316 Id. at 1101-03, NAFTA, art. 1106.
317 Id. at 1105-06, NAFTA, art. 1109.
318 Id. at 1099-1103, 1105-07, NAFrA, arts. 1102-03, 1106, 1109-10.
319 Id. at 1115-24, NArA, arts. 1115-39, annex 1120.1.
320 Id. at 1230-31, NA]rA, art. 1902. Article 1902 of the NAFTA requires, however, that
any changes or modifications to a signatory's antidumping or countervailing duty laws be
subject to notice to and consultation with the other NAFIA parties and not be inconsistent
with the GATT antidumping or subsidies codes. Id. at 1231, NAFTA, art. 1902(2) (d).
321 Id. at 1231-32, NAFrA, art. 1903.
322 Id. at 1232-36, NAFTA, art. 1904.
323 Id. at 1236-39, NAFMA, art. 1905.
324 The heart of the agreement, market access, is spelled out in separate sections relat-
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mitments relate to "qualifying" instead of "originating" goods, which
means that for origin purposes only the content of the two trading
partners is considered and the content of the third partner is treated
as non-NAFTA.3 25
As between the United States and Mexico, key features are to elim-
inate all quantitative import and export restrictions, 326 and to follow
special market access rules for particularly sensitive agricultural prod-
ucts.3 27 They did not, though, agree to eliminate export subsidies. 32 8
As for textiles, all tariffs on textiles and clothing are to be phased
out (by 1998 for U.S.-Canada trade and by 2003 for trade involving
Mexico), with immediate elimination of the United States quantitative
restrictions on Mexican origin textiles and apparel. 329 The special rule
of origin for textiles has been mentioned.330
Special provisions also apply to trade and investment in the auto-
motive sector.331 NAFTA parties agreed to eliminate all tariffs on
North American-origin automotive goods in ten years. Over the same
period Mexico agreed to eliminate the barriers stemming from its 1989
Auto Decree, such as local content and trade-balancing require-
ments. 33 2 There are also special rules for calculating regional value
content in automotive origin determinations.333
Specific rules also apply to trade in energy products and petro-
chemicals, such as petroleum, natural gas, coal, electricity, uranium
and other nuclear fuels, carbon black feedstocks, ethane, naphtha, bu-
tane and propane.33 4 NAFTA incorporates GATT" prohibitions or re-
strictions on trade in these areas and states that all NAFTA countries
interpret the prohibitions as barring minimum or maximum export-
price and import-price requirements. 33 5 The incorporation of GATT
rules is without limitations and exceptions, which means as a practical
matter that Mexico cannot cite its status as a developing country as a
ing to United States-Canada, Mexico-United States, and Mexico-Canada obligations. Id. at
948, NAFTA, annex 702.1 (incorporating CFTA commitments as between the United States
and Canada); id. at 950-59, NAFrA, annex 703.2 (enumerating Mexico-United States com-
mitments in Section A and Mexican-Canadian in Section B).
325 Id. at 956, 959, NAFTA, annex 703.2, §§ A(26), B(14).
326 See id. at 742-43, 950, NAFrA, art. 309, annex 703.2, § A, 11 1-3.
327 See id. at 951-55, NAFTA, annex 703.2, § A, 9-22 (these products are meat, pea-
nuts, sugar-containing products and sugar).
328 See id. at 944, NAIFTA, art. 705(2). The NAFTA parties agreed that as to trade with
Mexico, it would be, "inappropriate" to provide "an export subsidy for an agricultural prod-
uct" if "there are no other subsidized imports of that good" into the importing territory. Id.
Under this clause, United States export subsidies on wheat to Mexico, for example, would be
inappropriate only if Mexico had no other subsidized wheat imports.
329 Id. at 488, SAA at 39; id. at 820-30, NAFTA, annex 300-B.
330 See supra note 305.
33' H.R. Doc. No. 159, supra note 280, at 799-819, NA'FTA, annex 300-A.
332 Id. at 481-85, SAA at 32-36.
33 Id. at 890-93, NAFrA, art. 403.
334 Id. at 928-41, NAFTA, ch. 6.
335 Id. at 929, NAFTA, art. 603(1)-(2).
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basis for failing to comply with the rules incorporated into NAFTA.336
The NAFTA energy provisions also spell out Mexican reservations, 33 7
but on a negotiation-shortened list that the United States views as sub-
stantially increasing trade and investment opportunities for United
States firms in Mexico's petrochemicals sector.338
2. Trade in Services
NAFTA supplements the GATS with rules to be observed by Mex-
ico, Canada and the United States in regulating the provision of serv-
ices across their borders, including investment in services.33 9 These
provisions apply to all services sectors except for financial services,
which are subject to separate rules on trade and investment,340 air serv-
ices3 4 1 and government procurement in service sectors.3 42
The NAFTA provisions on cross-border trade in services contain
three basic protections: non-discriminatory treatment (national treat
ment and MFN) ;343 elimination of local presence requirements; 3 44 and
elimination of citizenship or permanent residency requirements for
professional service providers.3 45 Each NAFTA party, however, is given
two years to list and exempt existing non-conforming measures.3 46
The rules on investment relating to trade in goods also apply to
investment in service firms that operate through a local office or sub-
sidiary.3 47 Thus, the obligations of non-discrimination, freedom from
performance requirements, unrestricted fund transfers and conditions
on expropriation also apply to services.
3 48
Additional commitments ensure that basic telecommunications
services will be made available to individuals and firms of other NAFTA
parties on reasonable terms and conditions for the conduct of their
businesses.3 49 Reasonable conditions include non-discrimination,
which in the telecommunications context means between customers
and users.33 0 These access commitments protect firms that operate
336 Id. at 511, SAA at 62.
337 For example, the Government of Mexico reserved to itself certain "strategic activi-
ties," such as "exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas." Id. at 934, NAFTA,
annex 602.3(1) (a).
338 Id. at 514, SAA at 65; id. at 934, NAFTA, annex 602.3.
339 Id. at 1099-1150, NAFTA, chs. 11-13.
340 Id. at 1151-69, NAFTA, ch. 14.
341 Air services are the subject of bilateral akviation agreements among the three govern-
ments. See id. at 1128, NAFTA, art. 1201(2). NAFTA applies only to aircraft maintenance
and repair and specialty air services.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 1129, NAFTA, art. 1202-03.
344 Id. at 1129, NAFTA, art. 1205.
345 Id. at 1131-32, NAA, art. 1210(3).
346 Id. at 1129-30, 1132, NAFTA, arts. 1202-03, 1205-06, 1210(3).
347 Id. at 599, SAA at 150.
348 See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
349 Id. at 609, SAA at 160; see also id. at 1142-43, NAM'A, art. 1302.
350 Id. at 1142-43, NAFrA, art. 1302.
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private communications networks such as intracorporate phone sys-
tems.3 5 1 They also protect providers of "enhanced services" over the
country's basic telephone network, such as credit card validation sys-
tems, electronic mail and online databases.3 52
Separate rules apply to financial services. 353 With respect to gov-
ernmental measures on trade, special rules relate to the establishment
of financial institutions; cross-border financial services; non-discrimina-
tory treatment of investors, financial institutions and cross-border ser-
vice providers; new financial services and data processing; senior
management and boards of directors; and the transparency of finan-
cial services laws and regulations.3 54 More limited rules apply to invest-
ment in financial services. The NAFTA chapter on financial services
incorporates the investment protections related to unrestricted fund
transfers, expropriation and special arbitration for investors.355 Over-
all, when NAFTA was negotiated, the United States Administration
viewed it as providing "the first substantial access by the U.S. financial
services industry into Mexico in several decades."356
3. Intellectual Property Rights Protection
The NAFTA provisions on trade-related intellectual property
rights build on the baseline protections of the GATT/WTO counter-
part agreement. 357 Both agreements establish comprehensive stan-
dards for the protection of intellectual property, including its
enforcement through civil, criminal and border proceedings; 358 re-
quire each signatory to apply the Paris, Berne and other significant
intellectual property conventions;3 59 and supplement those obligations
in some respects.
NAFTA, though, applies full national treatment to intellectual
property owners, without the reservations set forth in the GATT/WTO
1994 TRIPs Agreement.3 60 It also provides more comprehensive pat-
ent protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical
inventions.3 61
4. Dispute Settlement
NAFTA includes its own dispute settlement mechanisms. Already
mentioned are the special provisions for arbitration of investor claims
351 Id. at 609, SAA at 160.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 1151-69, NAFTA, ch. 14.
354 Id. at 1152-56, 1158, NAFMA, arts. 1403-08, 1411.
355 Id. at 1151, NAYrA, art. 1401(2).
356 Id. at 617-18, SAA at 168-69.
357 Id. at 1196-1226, NAFrA, ch. 17.
358 Id. at 1211-19, NAFTA, arts. 1714-18.
35q Id. at 1196, NAFMA, art. 1701.
360 Id. at 1197, NAFTA, art. 1703.
361 Id. at 1202-06, NAFTA, art. 1709.
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and for review of antidumping and countervailing duty decisions. 3 62
Chapter 20 of NAFTA contains the institutional dispute settlement
mechanism.3 63
Chapter 20 authorizes government-to-government consultations
arising from disputes over the application or interpretation of any
NAFTA provision except those relating to antidumping and counter-
vailing duty law.3 64 If consultations are unsuccessful, a panel is estab-
lished.3 65 The ultimate penalty is the retaliatory suspension of NAFTA
benefits.
3 6 6
In February 1995, the United States requested formal NAFTA con-
sultations regarding Canadian tariffs applied to dairy and poultry prod-
ucts. These consultations were the first requested under the
NAFTA. 367 Consultations failed to resolve the dispute. On July 14,
1995, the United States formally requested a Chapter 20 dispute settle-
ment panel.3 68
Given the extensive overlap of the GATT/WTO and NAFTA, dis-
putes may arise under both agreements. With some exceptions,3 69
those may be settled in either forum at the complaining government's
discretion.3 70
B. Latin American Trading Arrangements
Sorting through the commitments of the various Latin American
subregional trading agreements can be a challenge. A helpful starting
point is the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).
ALADI is a 1980 treaty among eleven country members.3 71 It es-
tablishes the framework for Latin American economic integration
through regionwide preferential tariffs keyed to member countries'
economic status and the formation of regional and subregional agree-
362 See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
363 Id. at 1263-80, NAFTA, ch. 20, arts. 2001-22, annexes 2001.2, 2002.2, 2004.
364 Id. at 1265, NAFTA, art. 2004.
365 Id. at 1268-69, NAFrA, art. 2008.
366 Id. at 1266-75, NAFTA, arts. 2006-19.
367 See STATUS REPORT OF FTA AND NAFrA (Jan. 1995). Five such consultations arose
under the CFTA in its six years of existence, of which four involved agricultural or fisheries
products. Id. at 10.
368 See U.S. Issues NAFTA Challenge to Canada on Daiy, Poulity Taniffs, reprinted in Inside
U.S. Trade, July 21, 1995, at 21-22.
369 For example, if a NAFI'A Party claims that its contested action is subject to Article
104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements) and requests in writing that
the matter be considered under the NAFTA, the complaining NAFTA party may pursue dis-
pute settlement only under the NAFTA. See H.R. Doc. No. 159, supra note 280, at 1263,
NAFTA, art. 2005(3).
370 Id. at 1265-16, NAFTA, art. 2005.
371 Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug.
12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981). Signatories are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The forerunner agreement was
LAFTA. The acronym of ALADI in English is LALA.
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ment. 3 72 It is also outward looking, in that it allows members to estab-
lish multilateral linkages with countries outside Latin America.3 73 The
ALADI framework covers, among others, three major Latin American
integration initiatives: MERCOSUR, the Andean Group and the G-3.
MERCOSUR, or the Southern Region Common Market, covers
the most trade. 374 It stems from a 1991 agreement among Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.3 75 The original aim was to establish a
customs union with common external tariffs byJanuary 1, 1995.376 On
that date, the majority of common internal tariffs on almost 9,000 types
of products came into effect, and eighty-five percent of those products
became subject to a common external tariff system. 377
The five-member Andean Group (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela) originated in a 1969 agreement. 3 78 Although it
has undergone several transitions and a period of dormancy, it has
been revitalized. 379 The aim of the Group is a customs union, includ-
ing an Andean free-trade zone and a common external tariff (CET).38o
A four-tier CET took effect on February 1, 1995, except as to Bo-
livia and Peru.3 81 Bolivia retained a two-tier tariff structure of 5% and
10%.382 Peru has been on a "temporary self-suspension" from the
Group since 1992 (in part because of its objections to the CET), and
has maintained a two-tier tariff structure of 15% and 20%.383
A more recent initiative is the G-3. Mexico, Colombia and Vene-
zuela entered the G-3 Accord in June 1994, and it went into effect, as
scheduled, onJanuary 1, 1995.384 Its aim is a free trade area modelled
372 Id. arts. 4, 5.
373 Id. arts. 24-27.
374 In 1994, MERCOSUR "united 200 million people in a regional economy worth more
than $800 billion." Andrea Fornes, Mercosul. A Boost for Trade, INrr'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug.
29, 1994.
375 Treaty of Asuncion, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991); see U.S. Market Access in Latin America:
Recent Liberalization Measures and Remaining Barriers, Report to the Committee of Fi-
nance of the United States Senate, USITC Pub. 2521, Inv. No. 332-318, at 3-6 to 3-7 (June
1992) (Report to the Committee of Finance of the United States Senate) [hereinafter ITC
Market Access Report].
376 Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 375, art. 1, annex 1, at 1044-50.
377 See NTE REPoRT, supra note 85, at 9, 23. Most of the remaining items will be covered
by the CET by 2001, and all will be covered by 2005. Id. at 23.
378 Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910, at 25.
379 See Andean Pact: Official Codified Text of the Cartagena Agreement Incorporating
the Quito Protocol, July 26, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 1169. After five years of discussions, in 1987 the
members of the Andean Group agreed upon the Quito Protocol, which modified the Carta-
gena agreement to facilitate Andean economic integration. The Quito Protocol was
designed to add flexibility to the Cartagena Agreement. See id.
380 Id. arts. 3, 41-42, 61; see ITC Market Access Report, supra note 375, at 3-4 to 3-6.
381 SeeNTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 257 (the tiers impose 5%, 10%, 15% or 20% tariffs
on most products).
382 Id.
383 Id. at 67, 267. Peru is expected to announce its return to full participation in the
Group and the CET late in 1995. Id. at 267.
384 See Thomas A. O'Keefe, Operating Under the Group of Three (G-3) Trade Accord, 3 LATIN
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on NAFTA.3 85
Several other non-United States regional integration efforts are
underway in Latin America. MERCOSUR and the Andean Group, for
example, began formal negotiations on the creation of a free trade
area early in 1995.386 And since 1991, Chile has negotiated a series of
bilateral trade and investment treaties within the ALADI framework
with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.3 87
Although the agreements are not as extensive as the NAFTA, they gen-
erally include provisions relating to the major subject areas of the
NAFTA and the GATT/WFO Agreements, such as tariff and non-tariff
barriers, unfair trade practices, intellectual property protection and
dispute resolution.388
A 1992 United States government report concluded that these and
other Latin American initiatives have transformed their original poli-
cies from inward to outward looking.3 89 Original goals of establishing
protectionist regional trading blocs have given way to the goal of open-
ing up the Latin American economies to greater international compe-
tition.3 90 A longer term view of the agreements, thus, is that they
provide the building blocks for western hemispheric trade integration.
C. Western Hemispheric Integration
The goal of western hemispheric trade integration received a
boost at the December 1994 Summit of the Americas (Summit). The
Summit produced a Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action to
create economic integration in part by creating a Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA).391 The plan stopped short of endorsing a single
trading agreement. It focused, instead, on building on and harmoniz-
ing GATT/WTO disciplines with regional, subregional and bilateral
trade arrangements.3 92 Its thrust, though, was plainly in the direction
of a single free trade area agreement. 393
The plan stated no deadline for the FTAA, but it did set a fifteen-
month work schedule for holding meetings, studying regional trade
AM. L. & Bus. REP. 29. The agreement was not yet available in International Legal Materials
at the time this Article was prepared.
385 See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, LATIN AMERIC -FREE TRADE PACT (Dec. 20, 1993) (avail-
able on the National Trade Data Bank).
386 See Ursula M. Odiaga, Recent Trade and Investment Initiatives in Latin America and the
Caribbean, in THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT, at 213, 231 (1994).
387 Id.
388 See id. at 247-56 for a useful summary of the basic provisions of each of the Chilean
bilateral agreements organized by subject area.
389 ITC Market Access Report, supra note 375, at v-vi.
390 ITC Market Access Report, supra note 375, at 3-3.
391 Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles, Plan of Action, 11.9, Dec. 11,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 821-23 [hereinafter Summit of the Americas].
392 See id. para. 1.
393 See id. paras. 1-9.
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pacts, collecting data and planning future talks.3 94 It also called for a
ministerial meeting in March 1996 to review progress and propose a
timetable for further work.395 In the shorter term, the effort should
lead to greater harmonization and transparency of the various Latin
American regional trading agreements.
The FTAA effort may reinvigorate at least some portions of the
1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). 39 6 That initiative
had trade, investment and debt components. 3 97 The latter two were
never funded by Congress. The trade component, however, resulted
in a series of framework trade and investment agreements between the
United States and Latin American countries and trading groups, in-
cluding Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, MERCOSUR and others. 398 The
councils on trade and investment that were part of these framework
agreements provide potential vehicles for United States negotiation of
an FTAA. 399
IV. United States Laws Affecting Imports
National laws constitute a third layer of U.S.-Latin American trade
rules. Unlike the GATT/WTO 1994 agreements, NAFTA and other
regional agreements, these national laws are generally imposed on a
unilateral and non-reciprocal basis and are aimed at particular unfair
trading practices. In the United States, nine major sets of trade-related
laws affect Latin America.4 00
A. Actions Against Imports
Most United States trade laws involve import restrictions.
394 See id. para. 9. At the first ministerial meeting, held in Denver in June 1995, 34
nations signed the "Denver Declaration," oudining the framework for establishing a hemi-
spheric free trade area by 2005. Denver Declaration, July 5, 1995, para. 1, 5, reprinted in 12
Int'l Trade Rep. 27. The declaration also established seven working groups to facilitate nego-
tiations in the following areas: Market Access; Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin;
Investment; Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade; Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures;
Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; and the working group on the Smaller
Economies. Denver Declaration, supra, para. 5.
395 Summit of the Americas, supra note 391, para. 9. At the Denver ministerial meeting,
the participating countries agreed that the March 1996 meeting would be held in Colombia.
See Denver Declaration, supra note 394, para. 12. They agreed that the date and venue for
the third ministerial meeting would be set at the March meeting. Id.
396 See Message to the Congress Transmitting the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
Act of 1991, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 217-19 (Feb. 26, 1991).
397 See id.; see also ITC Market Access Report, supra note 375, at 4-3 to 4-6.
398 ITC Market Access Report, supra note 375, at 4-3 to 4-6.
399 See id.
400 This Article does not cover national trade laws in Latin America. The United States
laws, discussed in this part and in part V, relate to antidumping, countervailing duties, Sec-
tion 337, Section 201 (safeguards and escape clause), the Andean Trade Preferences Act,
GSP, export controls, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Section 301 (including Special 301
and Super 301).
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1. Antidumping Actions
The most frequent United States trade action against unfairly
traded imports is under the antidumping law.40 1 Since 1979, when the
law took its current form, there have been 113 antidumping investiga-
tions of Latin American products ranging from cement to floors to
vinyl film to steel; 40 2 thirty orders are in effect.40 3 If dumping is found,
the result is special duties on imports in addition to the normal cus-
toms duty, and the duties can be high enough to shut the market.40 4
An added disadvantage is that duties are typically applied on a com-
pany-specific basis, so that not all imports are affected equally.40 5
Dumping cases begin on the petition of domestic producers (or,
rarely, on self-initiation by the administering authority). 406 The two
prerequisites to a finding of dumping are: (1) sales for export to the
United States below prices of home or third country market sales, with
cost as a floor (the "dumping" determination); 40 7 and (2) material in-
jury, or threat, to domestic producers of the like product (the "injury"
determination).408 Both determinations follow intensive factual inves-
tigations and legal argument, within the space of about a year.40 9 The
information that responding foreign companies must produce for
each determination is extremely burdensome.
One particularly aggressive feature of United States antidumping
law relates to "circumvention." Circumvention occurs when a com-
pany shifts production subject to an antidumping order to a facility in
a new country, so that the product will be considered an export of that
401 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-73h, 1675, 1677, 1677a-77c, 1677e-77k (1988). Between 1990 and
1994, the United States initiated 246 antidumping investigations, representing 67% of all
United States trade actions. Other trade actions included: Section 337 actions (56, or 15%);
countervailing duty actions (49, or 13%); Section 301 actions (12, or 3%); and Section 201
actions (2, or 1%). See Garten, supra note 193.
402 DOC OPDERS IN EFr'Ecr, supra note 196.
403 Id.
404 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(c)(2). For example, the latest round of flat-rolled steel cases
resulted in antidumping deposit rates of 50% for Argentina, 35%-109% for Brazil and 49%-
59% for Mexico. See Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Argentina, 58 Fed.
Reg. 31,062 (1993); Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products, Certain Cold-Rolled Car-
bon Steel Flat Products, Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products, and Certain
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,091 (1993); Certain Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from
Mexico, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,192 (1993).
405 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.20 (a) (2) (ii)-(3) (ii) (1995); see Silicon Metal from Argentina, 58
Fed. Reg. 65,336 (1993). The Department of Commerce's review of exports of that product
in a given year resulted in antidumping duties of 2% for one company, 55% for another, and
9% for all other companies that export silicon metal from Argentina to the United States but
were not investigated in the review. Id.
406 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a).
407 Id. § 1673d(b)(1)(A).
408 Id. § 1673d(b)(1).
409 See 19 C.F.R. pts. 207, 353 and 355 (setting out regulatory timetables for antidumping
and countervailing duty investigations).
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new country and, thus, not covered by the antidumping order.410 The
United States "anticircumvention law" allows the administering author-
ity to expand an order in this situation, if necessary to avoid circumven-
tion.411 The effect is to limit the flexibility of multinational companies
to avoid antidumping duties by restructuring production
arrangements.
Another aggressive feature relates to "cumulation."412 Sometimes
domestic petitioners bring simultaneous dumping or countervailing
duty cases against a number of country suppliers. 413 In those in-
stances, the injury determination for any single country can be com-
bined with that of the other countries, under the cumulation
doctrine. 414 The result is that a small market share may not rescue a
minor foreign supplier from duties.415
The United States recently amended its law to implement the Uru-
guay Round antidumping agreement. 416
The amendments incorporate the procedural improvements men-
tioned in the GATT/WTO agreement discussion (minimum standing
requirements, 417 higher de minimis thresholds418 and sunset of or-
410 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j.
411 Id. The same provision applies to countervailing duty measures. The expanded or-
der can include imported parts if the new production location is the United States, or the
same product finished in a third country from target country parts. Id.
412 See id. §§ 1677(7) (C) (iv), 1677(7)(G). This provision also applies to countervailing
duty injury determinations.
413 For example, the United States steel industry filed antidumping petitions simultane-
ously against 21 countries in 1992. See Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products, 57 Fed.
Reg. 30,230 (1992) (Int'l Trade Comm'n notice of initiation).
414 See, e.g., Silicomanganese from Brazil, the PRC, Ukraine and Venezuela, USITC Pub.
2836, Inv. No. 731-TA-671-674 (Dec. 1994) (final determination). The International Trade
Commission cumulated imports from all four countries when performing its analysis to deter-
mine whether imports from those countries were causing material injury to the United States
industry. Id.
415 Recent amendments to the antidumping and countervailing duty laws afford some
relief to foreign suppliers importing small amounts of product. The law now provides that
imports that the International Trade Commission determines represent less than 3% of the
volume of all imports of the product at issue in the previous 12-month period are "negligi-
ble." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (adding
§ 222(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24)) [hereinafter URAA]. The law further provides that if the
Commission determines in its preliminary determination that imports are negligible, the in-
vestigation of those imports must terminate. URAA § 212(b)(2)(1994) (amending 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673b(a) (1988)).
416 See URAA, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
417 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (1988), amended by URAA § 212(a) (1994) requires that the
Department of Commerce must determine that A petition for antidumping investigation has
been filed "by or on behalf of the [domestic] industry" before initiating the investigation. Id.
The statute provides that a petition is filed "by or on behalf of the industry" only if: (1) the
United States petitioners filing the petition represent at least 25% of domestic production of
the product at issue; and (2) the United States producers or workers supporting the petition
account for "more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product produced
by that portion of the industry expressing support for or opposition to the petition." Id.
418 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b), amended by URAA §214 (1994), now provides that dumping
margins of "less than 2 percent ad valorem" will not result in antidumping duties. Id.
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ders419) and other changes that will affect calculation methodologies,
perhaps significantly in some cases. 420 On the whole, though, the An-
tidumping Agreement reflected preexisting United States law and
practice. Thus, the Uruguay Round should not prompt a major over-
haul of United States antidumping law.
2. Countervailing Duty Measures
Countervailing duty measures do not share the same degree of
notoriety as the United States antidumping law, perhaps because there
are far fewer of them and they typically result in far less punitive du-
ties. 421 Nonetheless, there have been some ninety countervailing duty
cases against Latin American products with thirty-seven countervailing
duty orders presently in effect.422 Nearly half involve steel and other
metals.423
This law deals with government export and domestic subsidies.424
Export subsidies are subsidies contingent on export.42 5 These are
countervailed without further ado, in the amount provided.42 6 For ex-
ample, the United States has assessed countervailing duties against:
Argentine imports benefitting from tax deductions that apply only to
export earnings;427 Brazilian imports that received financing loans on
terms available only to exporters; 428 and Venezuelan imports that
benefitted from remuneration for exports in the form of export
bonds.429
419 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c), amended by URAA § 220(a) (1994), now provides for the Depart-
ment of Commerce and the International Trade Commission to conduct "sunset reviews" five
years after the antidumping or countervailing duty order issued. The agencies will conduct a
review "to determine ... whether revocation ... would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may be) and of material
injury." Id. If the agencies find that revocation of the order would not lead both to the
recurrence of the unfair trade practice and material injury, the order will be revoked. Id.
420 For example, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1, amended by URAA §229(a) (1994), implements Arti-
cle 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement to allow the Department of Commerce to deter-
mine the export price (previously known as the United States price) of a product using price
averaging. Id. The new law also provides that in calculating the "constructed export price"
(the price at which a product that is imported into the United States by a party related to the
seller is sold to the first non-related party purchaser in the distribution chain), the Depart-
ment of Commerce must adjust the price by the actual profit made by the producer. 19
U.S.C. § 1677a, amended by URAA § 223 (1994). In the past, Commerce rarely averaged
United States prices and never deducted profit from United States price.
421 The United States countervailing duty law is in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h, 1675, 1677-
1677-2, 1677c-1677f, 1677g-1677h, 1677j (1988 & Supp. 1993).
422 See DOC ORDERS IN EfFEcr, supra note 196.
423 Id.
424 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
425 See id. § 1677(5A) (B), amended by URAA § 251(a) (1994).
426 See id. §§ 1677(5) and 1677(5A) (together, providing that export subsidies defined in
§ 1677(5A)(B) are specific and, therefore, countervailable).
427 Leather from Argentina, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,212, 40, 216 (1990) (final determination).
428 Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,837 (1986) (final determination).
429 Certain Electrical Conductor Aluminum Redraw Rod from Venezuela, 53 Fed. Reg.
24,763 (1988) (final determination).
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Domestic subsidies encompass all types of governmental internal
support with a financial benefit or equivalent, such as grants, loans,
loan guarantees, equity infusions to unequityworthy companies, goods
or services provided at preferential rates and debt forgiveness.430
These domestic subsidies are countervailed only if they are both "spe-
cific" to a particular industry or group, and preferential. 431
In past cases, the United States has countervailed products that
received preferential power rates provided to Venezuelan aluminum
producers;43 2 government infusions of equity into Peruvian steel com-
panies that the Department of Commerce determined were not
creditworthy;433 a Mexican Government below-market loan provided
to a company to cover the severance costs of privatization; 43 4 and the
provision of coal to Argentine steel companies at prices preferential to
those offered to other purchasers. 43 5
The United States countervailing duty law has also been amended,
as ofJanuary 1, 1995, to implement the Uruguay Round.43 6 One posi-
tive effect of the amended law is that all WTO signatories will now be
entitled to the injury test.43 7 In addition, the same procedural im-
provements that apply to antidumping duty cases also will apply in
countervailing duty context.438 On the other hand, these amendments
have some decidedly protectionist features that may increase the fre-
quency or severity of countervailing duty measures. 439 One feature of
particular relevance to Latin America relates to the treatment of subsi-
dies awarded pre-privatization to a formerly government-owned com-
430 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1988), amended 6y URAA § 251(a) (1994).
431 See id. § 1677(5A), amended y URAA § 251(a) (1994).
432 Certain Electrical Conductor Aluminum Redraw Rod from Venezuela, 53 Fed. Reg.
24,763 (1988) (final determination).
433 Deformed Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar from Peru, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,819 (1985).
434 Certain Steel Products from Mexico, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,352 (1993).
435 Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 56 Fed. Reg.
28,527 (1991).
436 URAA, §§ 251-91, 108 Stat. at 4902-27.
437 See supra notes 408, 413-15 and accompanying text. Previously, countries that were
not signatories to the GAT Subsidies Code, or that had not entered into agreements with
the United States that assumed substantially equivalent obligations to that Code or that re-
quired unconditional MFN, were not entitled to an injury test in United States countervailing
duty cases. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (a), (b) (1988); H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, at 923, SAA
at 253.
438 See supra notes 417-20 and accompanying text.
439 One particularly contentious area relates to the number of factors the Department of
Commerce must consider when determining which domestic subsidies are "specific" and,
hence, countervailable. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5), (5A), amended y URAA § 251 (1994). In its
1989 Proposed Regulations, the Department of Commerce set out a four-factor test to deter-
mine if subsidies were specific "in fact." See 19 C.F.R. Part 355: Countervailing Duties, 54
Fed. Reg. 23,366 (1989) (notice of proposed rulemaking and request for public comments)
(withdrawn); Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Article 1904 of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 80 (1995) (advanced notice of proposed rulemak-
ing and request for public comments). The law now explicitly states, however, that a subsidy
may be found specific if "one or more" of those factors, now a part of the statute, are satis-
fied. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A), amended y URAA § 251 (1994).
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pany. In a reversal of prior law, the new law establishes the policy that
an arms-length sale of a government company does not necessarily ex-
tinguish prior subsidies.440 This policy may be softened by a special
Subsidies Agreement rule for developing countries" 1 or by ongoing
litigation.442 It is likely, though, to remain a troubling issue for the
many Latin American companies now undergoing privatization that
export goods to the United States.
3. Section 337 Exclusion Proceedings
Until recently, the most draconian United States trade action
against imports was Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 44 3 This law
authorizes the President, on the petition of United States producers
and following an agency investigation, to bar imports of products that
infringe United States intellectual property rights, among other unfair
practices. 444 The exclusion orders, moreover, apply to all supplying
countries, regardless of the extent and source of the infringement.445
Presently there are forty-seven exclusion orders against products as di-
verse as caulking guns, cloisonne jewelry, key blanks, and soft
drinks.446
Recent amendments to United States law, however, have softened
the bite of Section 337. In response to a GATT Panel finding that
found that Section 337 violated GATT's national treatment provi-
sions,447 the United States amended the provision as part of the Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act (URAA). 448 Formerly short and strict
deadlines have been eliminated, easing some of the burden on foreign
respondents and improving their ability to mount an effective de-
fense.449 The authority to grant general exclusion orders has also
440 URAA, § 251, 108 Stat. at 4902 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (1988)).
441 The Subsidies Agreement provides that countries shall not consider developing
country subsidies provided in the context of a privatization program to be actionable, pro-
vided the privatization does occur. See H.R. Doc. No. 316, supra note 3, Subsidies Agree-
ment, art. 27.13.
442 The Department of Commerce's privatization methodology in pre-URAA cases is cur-
rently being appealed. See Saarstahl AG v. United States, 858 F.Supp. 187 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-1457 (Cir. 1994), Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 858
F.Supp. 179 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-1460 (Cir. 1994), British Steel plc v.
United States, 879 F.Supp. 1254 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (remanding to Dep't of Commerce);
British Steel plc v. United States, No. 95-17, slip op. (May 8, 1995) (remand determination);
British Steel plc v. United States, No. 95-17, slip op. (July 17, 1995) (remand determination).
These decisions may bear on the still relevant issue post-URAA of when privatization may
extinguish prior subsidies and to what extent.
443 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
444 Id. The law covers any "unfair" trade practice affecting imports, but has been used
principally to enforce patent rights.
445 Id.
446 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, MONTHLY CALENDAR, at 8-11
(Sept. 1995).
447 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
448 See URAA § 321 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)).
449 Id.
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been scaled back. That authority has not, however, been elimi-
nated. 450 Thus, Latin American goods involving United States patents,
trademarks or other intellectual property rights will continue to be ex-
posed to Section 337 exclusion proceedings.
4. Safeguard Actions
The United States version of safeguard actions, the "escape
clause" or "Section 201," allows duties and other restrictions to be im-
posed when increased imports, although not unfairly traded, are a
"substantial cause" of serious injury or threat.451 The escape clause,
however, has been invoked only once since 1992,452 and trade restric-
tions have resulted from fewer than half of all escape clause actions.45 3
The high standard of proof of causation makes these actions difficult
for United States petitioners to win. 454
The latest escape clause petition is illustrative. In March 1995,
United States tomato producers requested provisional safeguard relief
from Mexican and Canadian imports of fresh winter tomatoes. 455 That
request was denied. 456 United States producers then withdrew their
petition for relief, resulting in termination of the investigation. 457
Modifications to the United States law from the Uruguay Round
Safeguards Agreement will further dilute the impact of the United
States law.4 58 Maximum duration of relief will go from eight to four
years, 459 and a phase down of existing orders and breathing space be-
tween actions will be required. 460 Hence, the likely effect of the Uru-
guay Round will be to keep United States escape clause actions rare.
5. Trade Case Precursors
The most explicit warning of coming trade cases is inclusion of a
particular foreign government practice in the National Trade Estimate
Report (NTE Report or Report).4 61 The United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) has a statutory mandate to report every year on the
acts, policies or practices of foreign countries that constitute signifi-
450 See id.
451 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1988).
452 Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC Pub. 2881, Inv. No. TA-201-64, (April 1995) (Provi-
sional Relief Phase).
453 See Garten, supra note 193.
454 See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c).
455 Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC Pub. 2881, Inv. No. TA-201-64 (April 1995) (Provi-
sional Relief Phase).
456 Id.
457 Fresh Winter Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,248 (1995) (termination of investigation).
458 URAA §§ 301-04 (amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252-54 (1988)); see supra notes 185-92
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Safeguards Agreement.
459 URAA § 302(b) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e) (1) (1988)).
460 URAA § 302(b)(3), (4) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(5), (7)(A) (1988)).
461 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
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cant barriers to United States exports or foreign direct investment.462
The NTE Report issues each March. 463 It is the springboard for bilat-
eral consultations and also for Special 301 and Super 301 actions.H4
To the extent it identifies foreign government subsidies, it may also
signal an incipient countervailing duty petition.
The 1995 NTE Report identified numerous Latin American prac-
tices that constitute barriers to United States goods and services,
though the Report also noted substantial progress toward removing
these barriers.465 All of the Latin American countries discussed in the
Report were criticized for inadequate intellectual property protec-
tion.466 Brazil received the most attention of the Latin American
countries, garnering criticism for its intellectual property laws, import
policies, government procurement practices and barriers to trade in
services and investment. 467 Some examples of other practices named
in the Report include: Argentina's restrictive import policies, includ-
ing import quotas on automobiles;468 Chile's "price band" system for
wheat, wheat flour, edible oils and sugar;469 and Colombia's agricul-
tural protections and local-ownership restrictions on services. 470
A second precursor is a fact-finding investigation by the United
States International Trade Commission under Section 332 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.471 These investigations are not themselves trade actions
and do not result in restrictive import measures. 472 They do, however,
mobilize the United States government's information gathering ef-
forts, and usually result in public, detailed reports on the conditions of
competition in the industry in question. 473 In so doing they provide
essential material for antidumping, countervailing duty or other trade
action petitions. For example, the antidumping and countervailing
duty cases against Brazilian iron construction castings followed a Sec-
tion 332 study of the foundry industry, including the castings
462 Id. § 2241 (a).
463 Id. § 2241(b).
464 See infra notes 536-58 and accompanying text for discussions of Special 301 and
Super 301.
465 The Report covered Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
466 See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 10, 25-27, 44-45, 69-70, 75-76, 84, 120-21, 134, 233,
245-46, 258-59, 316-17. Although the Report acknowledged that Mexico had "significantly
increased its intellectual property protection," the Report cautioned that enforcement of the
intellectual property rights remained a concern. Id. at 233.
467 Id. at 23-29.
468 Id. at 9.
469 Id. at 43. See supra notes 93-94 for a discussion of price band systems.
470 See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 67-72.
471 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
472 See it
473 See, e.g., Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Indus-
tries: Pharmaceuticals, USITC Pub. 2437, Inv. 332-302 (Sept. 1991). The ITC also prepares
annual reports under Section 332 on the economic effects of the Andean Trade Preference
Act and the Caribbean Basic Economic Recovery Act.
1995]
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segment. 474
B. Import Preferences
Some United States laws assist imports by providing tariff prefer-
ences on a non-reciprocal basis. The main source of preferential tariffs
for Latin American products is the Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA) 475
As part of the war on drugs, this 1991 law reduced or eliminated
customs duties on some 6,000 Andean products for ten years. 476 Spe-
cial rules of origin apply; basically, Andean materials or processing
must add 35% to the value of the good.477 Textiles and apparel and
other specified articles have not been covered in the past.4 78 In August
1995, however, the United States announced that it would establish a
special-access textile program for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru.4 79 Colombian imports of cotton, wool and man-made fiber un-
derwear will be the first to benefit from this program. According to
the first report on the ATPA, Colombia supplied 68% of the 1993 im-
ports into the United States under the ATPA,480 and 60% of all ATPA
imports were cut flowers. 48'
Latin American countries outside of the Andean region also qual-
ify for preferential tariffs, under the Generalized System of Preferences(GSP). 482 Under the GSP, goods from some 150 designated benefici-
ary countries worldwide enter the United States duty-free if they meet
certain conditions, including a 35% value-added test of origination. 483
Textiles and other products were specifically excluded. 484 This pro-
gram expired on July 31, 1995,485 but its renewal is presently under
474 See Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Foundry Industry, USITC Pub. 1582, Inv. 332-
176 (Sept. 1984); Certain Heavy Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,462
(1985) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation).
475 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-06.
476 See Annual Report On the Impact of the Andean Trade Preference Act on U.S. In-
dustries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, USITC Pub.
2814, Inv. No. 332-352, at 32-33 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter ATPA Annual Report].
477 19 U.S.C. § 3203(a).
478 Id. § 3203(b).
479 See Establishment of a Special Access Program for Andean Trade Preference Act
Countries, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,144 (1995). Agreements with each of the eligible countries must
be concluded before the program will apply to their imports. Id.; see Establishment and
Amendment of Import Limits, Amendment of a Restraint Period and Announcement of Spe-
cial Access Levels for Certain Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products Produced
in or Manufactured in Colombia, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,144 (1995).
480 ATPA Annual Report, supra note 476, at 32-33.
481 Id. at 30.
482 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (discussing GSP).
483 See id. § 2463(b).
484 Id. at § 2463(c).
485 On July 5, 1995, the United States Customs Service notified importers that claims for
duty-free treatment under the GSP could not be made for merchandise entered or with-
drawn from warehouse on or after August 1, 1995. General Notice: Procedures if the Gener-
alized System of Preferences Program Expires, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,103 (1995). Also in July, the
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consideration by Congress and seems likely. 486
V. United States Laws Affecting Exports
As in the import area, United States export-related laws can both
restrain and assist exports.
A. Restraints on Exports and Overseas Business
The two main sources of restraint are export controls and the
United States anti-bribery law.
1. Export Controls
Three sets of export control regulations may apply to exports to
Latin America. First, the Commerce Department's Export Administra-
tion Regulations (EAR) often require specific licenses before export-
ing certain non-military commodities and technical information
(individual validated license or IVL).487 Most commercial products
and technology do not require an IVL for export to most destina-
tions.488 Generally speaking, an IVL is required only where the com-
modity or technology to be exported has a potential military
application. In addition to controlling exports for national security
reasons, however, the EAR also impose licensing requirements based
on foreign policy, short supply and nonproliferation concerns. 489
Cuba, for example, is subject to a total embargo under the EAR for
foreign policy reasons.
The EAR also apply to reexports of United States-origin goods and
technical data from one foreign country to another. The definition of
United States origin under the EAR is extremely broad; it includes for-
eign-produced products incorporating a certain percentage of United
States parts or materials and United States technical data that has been
USTR announced which products would be considered in the 1995 Annual GSP Review of
products to be added or removed from the list of eligible products. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP); Notice Regarding the 1995 Annual GSP Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,856
(1995). The USTR did not announce a review timetable, however, noting that it would do so
once the GSP program had been renewed. Id. at 38, 857.
486 H.R. 1654, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would renew the GSP program is
currently under review in Congress. The House of Representatives Ways and Means Commit-
tee approved a 30-month extension of the program in September 1995. A third program, the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), extends duty-free entry to Caribbean products under terms
similar to the ATPA. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06; seeAnnual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act on U.S. Industries and Consumers, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,779 (1995)
(notice of opportunity to submit comments in connection with 1994 annual report); see also
Annual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean Basic Economic Recovery Act on U.S. Indus-
tries and Consumers, 51 Fed. Reg. 17,678 (1986) (institution of investigation 332-227 and
publication of investigation schedule). The 1994 report is the tenth annual report on the
CBI.
487 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1995).
488 Se U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BuREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, INTRODUCTION TO
THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS, at i (1994); 15 C.F.R. §779.
489 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 777, 778, 785.
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commingled with foreign-origin data.490 This broad extraterritorial ef-
fect increases EAR potency.
Second, the Department of State controls exports of military
equipment, information and services under the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 491 The ITAR contains the United States
Munitions List.492 Some of the items on the list may have a dual mili-
tary and civilian use, such as products with encryption capabilities and
communications satellites. 493 All products on this list are subject to
specific export licensing requirements to any destination except, in
most cases, Canada.494 ITAR licensing policy is generally favorable for
Latin America, except that no exports are approved to Cuba,495 and
defense articles currently may not be exported to Ecuador or Peru due
to the recent border conflict between those countries. 496
Finally, the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) administers economic sanctions against particular
countries. 497 Currently, OFAC sanctions bar all transactions between
United States individuals and entities, including foreign entities owned
or controlled by United States companies, and Cuba.498
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The United States anti-bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), should never be overlooked when doing business over-
seas. It has a long reach, its application is not always obvious, and it is
backed by active enforcement and potentially severe civil and criminal
penalties for corporations and individuals. 499 It is particularly relevant
to business dealings with Latin America, because some practices com-
mon to establishing and conducting business there-such as using lo-
cal consultants to thread through local bureaucracies, or dealing with
the government during privatization-can create FCPA liability if not
handled properly.
The FCPA prohibits United States companies from paying foreign
government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business
or for directing business to any person.5 ° ° It also requires United
States "issuers" (registered companies under the Securities and Ex-
490 See id. §§ 776.12; 779, 1 (Supp. 1 1995).
491 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1995).
492 Id. § 121.
493 See 15 C.F.R. § 121.1 (Categories XIII and XV of the United States Munitions List).
494 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 126, 126.5.
495 Id. § 126.1(a).
496 See Policy on Munitions Export Licenses to Ecuador and Peru, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,138
(1995).
497 See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500-590 (1994).
498 Id. §§ 515.201(b), 515.329(d).
499 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994).
500 Id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
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change Act of 1934)501 to maintain certain records and internal ac-
counting controls in connection with overseas business.50 2 Thus,
unlike most other United States trade laws, it targets the sales process
rather than the product or services sold.
The long reach and much of the gray area of the law stem from
the FCPA's coverage of foreign agents and intermediaries.50 3 A
United States company can be held liable for its foreign agent's illegal
payments, even if the company did not actually know of them;50 4
knowledge is imputed if circumstances should reasonably have alerted
the company to the problem.50 5 Some of the circumstances consid-
ered to be red flags are obvious, like an agent that demands an exces-
sive commission or payment in cash. Others are less so, like an agent
that is related to a government official or partial ownership of the
agent's company by the family of a government official. Seemingly in-
nocuous circumstances, hence, can potentially snag unknowing United
States businesses.
Other troublesome FCPA provisions are that it applies to offers
and promises to pay as well as to actual payments, 50 6 and to "anything
of value" including gifts and favors. 507 Payments not only to foreign
government officials but also to political parties and employees of gov-
ernment-owned enterprises also fall within the FCPA net.50 8 On bal-
ance, problems with this United States law are best avoided through a
broad internal compliance program.5 0 9
Several well-publicized past investigations have involved Latin
America. In one case, Digital Telephone Systems was charged (and
eventually acquitted) of attempting to obtain telecommunications con-
tracts through bribes allegedly made to Colombian officials by a con-
sultant.5 10  Another criminal prosecution was of International
Harvester Company and several of its employees; they were alleged to
have bribed officials of Pemex, the national oil company of Mexico, in
order to obtain large contracts with that concern.5 1' The company
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.51 2
501 See id. §§ 78dd-1, 781, 78o(d).
502 Id. § 78m(b).
503 Id. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (3), 78dd-2(a)(3).
504 Id. §§ 78dd-l (f) (2) (B), 78dd-2(h) (3) (B).
505 Id.
506 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).
507 Id.
508 Id. §8 78dd-1 (a) (2), 78dd-2(a) (2).
509 The Justice Department also has a non-binding, pre-review procedure that may be
helpful in certain, limited circumstances. 28 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1994).
510 See United States v. O'Hara, 960 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1992).
511 See United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050
(1985) (setting out procedural history of the case).
512 See id. at 657.
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B. Market Access Levers for U.S. Exports
The infamous Section 301, enhanced by Special 301 and Super
301, is typically viewed as a trade action against imports. Indeed, that is
how it can function if a particular case results in retaliation. Few cases
do, however; retaliatory United States import restrictions have resulted
from only sixteen of the ninety-five Section 301 cases initiated between
1975 and 1994.513 A more accurate view of Section 301 is as a lever for
opening foreign markets to United States exports.
514
1. Regular Section 301
The basic statute is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.515 Sec-
tion 301 allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on a
private party's petition or its own initiative, to enforce United States
rights under trade agreements and to respond to unreasonable, unjus-
tifiable or discriminatory foreign government practices. 516 It assists
United States exporters in three ways.
First, and most important, is that the law focuses on government
conduct affecting foreign market access. Other United States trade
laws, by contrast, reach foreign practices only as they affect United
States imports.5 17 For example, a 1985 Section 301 action targeted
Brazil's Informatics Law, which restricted United States trade and in-
vestment in the informatics sector in Brazil through import restric-
tions, local content and export performance requirements and other
means. 518 The investigation brought about the enactment of a new
software law in Brazil. 519 The law even reaches third country markets,
as illustrated by a recent petition against Indonesian practices alleged
unfairly to enhance Indonesian pencil slat exports to important third
513 Se THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY A. ELLioTrr, RECIPROCIrY AND RETALIATION IN U.S.
TRADE POLICY 66 (1994) (covering investigations through April 1994); Section 304 Determi-
nation: Acts, Policies and Practices of Brazil With Respect to the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,224 (1994) (terminating investigation and
revoking priority foreign country status in light of promises to enact legislation); Determina-
tion of Action Concerning the People's Republic of China's Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Provision of Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual Property Protection,
60 Fed. Reg. 7230 (1995) (announcing increased tariffs); Termination of Investigation: Bar-
riers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,253 (1995)
(terminating investigation in light of satisfactory resolution of dispute); Termination of In-
vestigation: Initiation of New Investigation and Request for Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg.
52,026 (1995) (terminating investigation in favor of WTO dispute settlement and initiating
investigation of related policies); Korean Agricultural Market Access Restrictions, 59 Fed.
Reg. 61,006 (1994) (initiating investigation and requesting public comment).
514 See BAYARD AND ELLiOTr, supra note 513, at 355-69.
515 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-17 (1988).
516 Id.
517 See, e.g., supra notes 400-60 and accompanying text.
518 Brazil Informatics, USTR, SEcrON 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 30149 (Feb. 1994);
Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,993-94 (1986).
519 See Brazil Informatics, USTR, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-49 (Feb.
1994).
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country markets for United States producers. 520 The USTR, thus, can
address barriers to United States exports erected anywhere in the
world.
Second, the law is broad, especially in the definition of "unreason-
able" practices. 52 1 It reaches any type of foreign government practice
that is "unfair and inequitable," even if no international legal rights of
the United States are violated.522 The statute specifically identifies as
unreasonable, for example, government non-protection of intellectual
property rights, toleration of private anticompetitive conduct and ex-
port targeting.525 Under the toleration component, furthermore, pri-
vate monopolistic behavior may be actionable, if it is entangled with a
government policy or act.524
Third, Section 301 allows remedies shaped to the injury.525 In ad-
dition to increased duties, the USTR's arsenal includes authority to
enter binding agreements to eliminate the actionable practices, sus-
pend trade agreement concessions and impose other import restric-
tions.526 For example, in 1982 the United States used a multi-pronged
approach to obtain relief for the United States specialty steel industry,
which alleged that foreign subsidies to steel companies violated the
GATT and the GATT Subsidies Code, and injured the United States
industry. The USTR initiated Section 301 investigations of the coun-
tries involved, undertook monitoring of the imports, requested the In-
ternational Trade Commission to conduct an expedited Section 201
investigation of the products at issue and initiated consultations with
the foreign governments to resolve the dispute. 527 The International
Trade Commission found that the imported products were causing in-
jury, and the President imposed a combination of tariffs and quotas.52 8
520 See Indonesia Pencil Slats, USTR, SECrION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-90 (Feb.
1994).
521 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3) (1988).
522 Id.
523 Id § 2411(d) (3) (B).
524 Id. For example, in 1985 the USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation of Korean
practices that restricted the ability of United States insurers to provide insurance services in
the Korean market. See Korea Insurance, USTR, SECrION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. Nos. 301-
20, 301-51 (Feb. 1994). The private monopolistic behavior was entangled with several acts of
the Government of Korea, such as the refusal to allow a United States firm to underwrite risks
or to participate in joint ventures, and the failure to grant retrocessions to the United States
firm on the same basis as Korean firms. Following consultations, Korea and the United States
entered into an agreement that increased United States firms' access to the Korean market
by enabling them to underwrite insurance. Korea Insurance, USTR, SEcrION 301 TABLE OF
CASES, Inv. No. 301-51 (Feb. 1994).
525 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
526 Id.
527 Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717
(1982).
528 See Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, USITC Pub. 1377, Inv. 201-TA-48 (May 1983);
Austria Specialty Steel Domestic Subsidies, USTR, SECrION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-
27 (Feb. 1994).
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This flexibility gives the USTR the clout to achieve its negotiating
objectives.
Section 301 and GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures inter-
sect in cases involving those agreements. A Section 301 case that in-
volves a trade agreement triggers government-to-government
consultations under that agreement.5 29 However, the USTR must
make its unilateral determination of unfairness within twelve to eight-
een months in every case, even if related international procedures
have not yet concluded.5 30
Between 1975 and 1994 there were eleven Section 301 investiga-
tions against Latin American countries, all involving Argentina or Bra-
zil. 53 ' The USTR imposed retaliatory measures in two of those
investigations. In one case, the United States revoked bilateral conces-
sions under an agreement on trade in leather hides from Argentina,
and raised tariffs on those products. 5 32 In the other, the United States
imposed increased tariffs of 100% on various Brazilian products (in-
cluding such items as televisions, toilet paper and microwaves) in retal-
iation for inadequate patent protection for pharmaceuticals. 533
In 1995, the USTR initiated Section 301 investigations against Co-
lombia and Costa Rica. The investigations were launched in response
to Colombia's and Costa Rica's implementation of a framework agree-
ment that they, along with Nicaragua and Venezuela, entered into with
the European Union on trade in bananas. 534 The United States indus-
try alleged that exportation of bananas from Colombia and Costa Rica
in accordance with the framework agreement discriminates against
United States banana producers exporting from Latin America and im-
pairs their access to European markets. 53 5
529 19 U.S.C. § 2413.
530 Id. § 2414.
531 See USTR, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES (Feb. 1994).
532 Argentina Hides, USTR, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-24 (Feb. 1994);
Proclamation No. 4993, 3 C.F.R. 103 (1982) (announcing revocation of concessions and in-
creased tariffs).
533 See Brazil Pharmaceuticals, USTR, SECION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-61 (Feb.
1994); Proclamation No. 5885, 3 C.F.R. 149 (1988) (announcing tariffs). The increased tar-
iffs were terminated effective July 2, 1990, in reaction to Brazil's promise to enact legislation
to protect pharmaceutical patents. Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain
Articles from Brazil, 55 Fed. Reg. 2,7324 (1990).
534 Initiation of Section 302 Investigation Regarding Policies and Practices of the Gov-
ernment of Colombia Concerning the Exportation of Bananas to the European Union, 60
Fed. Reg. 3283 (1995) [hereinafter Colombian Bananas]; Initiation of Section 302 Investiga-
tion Regarding Policies and Practices of the Government of Costa Rica Concerning the Ex-
portation of Bananas to the European Union, 60 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1995) [hereinafter Costa
Rican Bananas]. United States banana producers also petitioned for Section 301 investiga-
tions of Nicaragua and Venezuela based on the banana framework agreement. See Colom-
bian Bananas, supra, at 3283. The USTR declined to initiate on any of the countries unless
they took steps to implement the framework. Id. To date, only Colombia and Costa Rica
have taken such action. Id. See Costa Rican Bananas, supra, at 3284.
535 See Colombian Bananas, supra note 534, at 3283.
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2. Special 301
Section 301 has two variants, Special 301 and Super 301. Special
301 establishes a procedure for funnelling cross-border intellectual
property rights issues into the Section 301 process.536 Within thirty
days of the NTE Report discussed above,537 the USTR must name the
"priority foreign countries" that most egregiously deny adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights.53 8 It must then in-
vestigate these practices under Section 301. 539 The USTR has miti-
gated this procedure by creating three administrative "lists:" those of
countries posing "particularly serious" problems, also known as the
"potential priority foreign country" list;540 a "priority watch list;" and a
"watch list."541 The purpose of these warnings is to spur bilateral nego-
tiations to avoid the ultimate Special 301 categorization.5 42
Although Argentina has flirted with Special 301 because of patent
issues, Brazil is the only Latin American country that has been identi-
fied as a "priority foreign country."543 It was so named in 1993 in an
ongoing dispute over various inadequacies in its intellectual property
protections, including its patent protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.3 44 The USTR terminated its investigation and revoked Brazil's
"priority foreign country" status in 1994 when Brazil pledged to enact
new patent laws.5 45 In 1995, USTR named Brazil to the priority watch
list because of its continued failure to enact the patent laws.5 46 The
536 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
537 See supra notes 461-64 and accompanying text.
538 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a) (2), (b).
539 Id. § 2412(b)(2).
540 See Identification of Foreign Countries That Deny Adequate and Effective Intellec-
tual Property Protection or Market Access to Persons That Rely on Intellectual Property Pro-
tection, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,341 (1994). Countries on this list will be reviewed within 60 days of
the USTR's announcement of that status to determine whether they have taken any action to
improve their intellectual property protection. If they have not done so, they are named
priority foreign countries. See id.
541 See id. (noting that the watch lists were "administratively created").
542 Thus, for example, Argentina's placement on the "watch list" in May 1989 led to
consultations regarding its patent law. Those consultations continue and Argentina remains
on the watch list. See NTE REPORT, supra note 85, at 9; 1993 USTR NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATE
REP. ON FoREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 8.
543 The USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation and sought consultations with the
Brazilian government. Initiation of Section 301 Investigation and Request for Public Com-
ment: Intellectual Property Laws and Practices of the Republic of Brazil, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,788
(1993).
544 Brazil Intellectual Property Rights, USTR, SEMaON 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-
91 (Feb. 1994); see Bayard & Elliott, supra note 513, ch.8.
545 Section 304 Determination: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Brazil With Respect To
The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights; Termination of Investiga-
tion and Revocation of Priority Foreign Country Status, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,224 (1994); see also
1994 USTR NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATE REP. ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 23. Other Latin Ameri-
can countries have been named to the watch lists in recent years. See supra notes 267-69, 466-
67 and accompanying text.
546 See USTR, USTR ANNOUNCES Two DECISIONS: TmTLE VII AND SPECIAL 301, at 10 (Apr.
29, 1995) (press release 95-32).
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USTR also included Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela in the watch list due to continued
perceived inadequacies in their intellectual property protection. 547
3. Super 301
Super 301 deals with any type of onerous trade barrier and re-
quires the USTR to name "foreign priority country practices" requiring
trade liberalization to increase United States exports. 548 The naming
must take place six months after submission of the NTE Report to Con-
gress.549 These practices then become subject to a Section 301 ac-
tion.550 In 1989, the USTR cited Brazil's import licensing system
applied to manufactured goods as a "priority foreign country prac-
tice."551 The USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation, which
brought about the elimination of that system. 55
2
The USTR did not name any practices in 1995.553 The USTR did
note, however, that it is pursuing negotiations with several countries
on different issues, including with Mexico on that country's refusal to
allow a United States firm to operate an over-land small package deliv-
ery service, even though Mexican firms can do so and Mexico agreed
in NAFTA to provide national treatment in this sector. 554
Super 301 was enacted in 1988 for two years. 555 It lapsed after the
1990 designation of priority practices, and was renewed by an Execu-
tive Order for 1994 and 1995.556 The URAA, which was enacted sev-
eral months after the Executive Order, also authorized extension of
Super 301 to 1995. 557 The President recently renewed Super 301 until
1997.558
4. The Future
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the future of Section
547 Id. at 12-15, 17.
548 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988); see also Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
549 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a).
550 Id. § 2420(b).
551 Report of Trade Liberalization Priorities Pursuant to Section 310 of the Trade Act of
1974, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,438 (1989).
552 Brazil Import Licensing, USTR, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, Inv. No. 301-73 (Feb.
1994).
553 See Report on Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Section 310 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,028 (1995).
554 See id. at 52,030.
55 See 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
556 See Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
557 URAA Pub. L. No. 103-465. § 314(f), 108 Stat. 4809, 4939 (1994) (amending 19
U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)). The URAA provision differs from the Executive Order in one respect.
The Executive Order had provided that "The authorities delegated pursuant to this order
shall be exercised subject to any subsequent direction by the President in a particular mat-
ter." Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. at 10,728 (1994). The URAA removed that condi-
tion. URAA § 314(f).
558 Exec. Order No. 12,973, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,665 (1995).
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301 is uncertain. One view is that Section 301 has historically filled in
the cracks between United States trade agreements, protecting United
States "rights" in areas GATT did not reach.5 59 With stronger and
broader worldwide disciplines, particularly on agricultural subsidies,
services, and intellectual property, the impetus for Section 301 should
diminish.
On the other hand, more foreign practices are now subject to
trade agreements. This expansion has the double effect of increasing
the number of foreign government practices potentially actionable as
trade agreement violations, and eliminating the need to show a bur-
den or restriction on commerce as a Section 301 prerequisite. 5 60 Fur-
thermore, new provisions of United States law involve the USTR in
policing the red, yellow and green light categories of subsidies under
the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement, calling for Section 301 ac-
tion under various circumstances. 561 These effects may invigorate
rather than wither Section 301.
VI. Conclusion
Trade laws establish the conditions of trade in virtually all sectors;
can create enormous pitfalls if ignored or violated; and can occasion-
ally be used on a targeted basis to assist the export of particular types
of goods or services. The proliferation of subregional agreements and
inconsistences among them and with NAFTA and the GATT/WTO
agreements complicate business planning. Nonetheless, in planning
to do business with Latin America, trade laws should be as important a
consideration as financing, distribution arrangements and other essen-
tial cross-border business elements.
559 BAYARD & ELLior, supra note 513, at 12.
560 The latter requirement attends only non-trade agreement-based Section 301 actions.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
561 URAA § 281 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988)).
19951

